The Learned Hand Unformula for Short-Swing Liability by Chin, Andrew
Washington Law Review 
Volume 91 Number 4 
12-1-2016 
The Learned Hand Unformula for Short-Swing Liability 
Andrew Chin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Securities Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Andrew Chin, The Learned Hand Unformula for Short-Swing Liability, 91 Wash. L. Rev. 1523 (2016). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol91/iss4/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
07 - Chin.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/20/2016  12:50 PM 
   
 
1523 
 
THE LEARNED HAND UNFORMULA  
FOR SHORT-SWING LIABILITY 
Andrew Chin* 
Abstract: Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 allows for the recovery of 
short-swing profits realized by certain insiders from trading in a corporation’s stock within a 
period of less than six months. Three generations of corporate law students have been taught 
the “lowest-in, highest-out” formula that is intended to maximize the disgorgement of short-
swing profits under section 16(b). Arnold Jacobs’s 1987 treatise presented two hypothetical 
examples where the formula fell short of the intended maximum, but courts, commentators, 
and practitioners have largely ignored these theoretical challenges to the formula’s validity. 
This Article identifies Gratz v. Claughton as the first reported real-world example of the 
formula’s failure. Ironically, Gratz has been taught and cited for more than sixty years as a 
leading authority for the formula’s use, not least because of its distinguished author, Judge 
Learned Hand. This Article argues that Gratz has been misunderstood and that Hand wisely 
adjudicated this complex case without prescribing or endorsing the formula in any way. It 
also shows that the formula has no need of Gratz’s endorsement, as long as the formula is 
correctly interpreted as limited to simpler cases where it is mathematically valid. It 
formalizes and extends Jacobs’s results by showing that the formula may fall short of the 
maximum by up to fifty percent when misused in more complex cases, and has actually fallen 
short in another more recent case. Finally, it provides online tools to enable practitioners and 
judges to calculate short-swing liability correctly in all cases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,1 certain 
insiders may be held liable to a corporation for any “short-swing” profits 
realized from trading in the corporation’s stock within a period of less 
than six months. The corporation is entitled to disgorgement of the 
maximum possible profit that can be calculated by any matching of the 
insider’s purchases and sales within less than six months, according to 
Second Circuit case law, which has long been authoritative on the 
subject.2 
In Smolowe v. Delendo Corp.,3 the Second Circuit adopted the 
“lowest-in, highest-out” formula as a simple calculation intended to 
maximize the disgorgement of short-swing profits under section 16(b).4 
The liability calculation in Smolowe involved a relatively simple 
                                                     
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2012). 
2 DETLEV F. VAGTS, BASIC CORPORATION LAW 552 (3d ed. 1989) (“Opinions by the Second 
Circuit in the Section 16 field are generally regarded as authoritative.”). 
3 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943). 
4 See id. at 239. 
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sequence of insider transactions, all of which took place within a single 
six-month period and within the two-year statute of limitations.5 In a 
1987 article, however, Arnold Jacobs presented hypothetical examples 
showing that the Smolowe formula6 may fall short of maximizing the 
short-swing profit calculation in situations in which the insider’s trades 
span a period of more than six months or when some trades are not 
within the statute of limitations.7 In these situations, the calendar can 
preclude the recovery of profits from matching some low-priced 
purchases with higher-priced sales, a complication the Smolowe formula 
was not designed to take into account.8 Courts, commentators, and 
practitioners, however, have largely ignored these theoretical challenges 
to the formula’s validity in adopting the Smolowe formula for use in all 
section 16(b) liability calculations.9 
This Article identifies another early Second Circuit case, Gratz v. 
Claughton,10 as the first reported real-world example of the Smolowe 
formula’s failure to calculate the maximum possible profit. The liability 
calculation in Gratz was too complicated for the formula because it 
involved a sequence of hundreds of insider transactions spanning more 
than twenty-one months.11 Ironically, Gratz has been a staple of 
corporate case law and casebooks for more than sixty years as a leading 
authority for the formula’s use, not least because of its distinguished 
author, Judge Learned Hand.12 However, neither the Second Circuit nor 
the district court performed any calculations in Gratz. In district court 
proceedings before a special master, the defendant proffered a liability 
                                                     
5 Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 46 F. Supp. 758, 761, 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) [hereinafter  
Smolowe I].  
6 The formula will be referred to hereinafter as “the Smolowe formula” (or simply “the formula” 
when clear from context). The more common designation “the Smolowe rule” will not be used in 
order to avoid unintended connotations of legal authority in light of the formula’s questionable 
applicability in complex cases.  
7 Arnold S. Jacobs, An Analysis of Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 32 N.Y. L. 
SCH. L. REV. 209, 532–33 (1987). 
8 See id. 
9 See, e.g., Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 847–48 (2d Cir. 1959); LOUIS LOSS & JOEL 
SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 693 (5th ed. 2004); WILLIAM K.S. WANG 
& MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING 924 n.12 (3d ed. 2010). 
10 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1951). 
11 See Def.’s Exhibits 5 & P, Gratz v. Claughton, No. 35-410 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (hereinafter “Gratz 
Master’s Report”) (listing, inter alia, 276 purchases and 101 sales of common stock and 11 
purchases and 20 sales of preferred stock between December 18, 1944 and September 24, 1946). 
12 See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Judge Learned Hand: The  Man, the Myth, the Biography, 20 J. SUP. 
CT. HIST. 47, 47 (1995) (describing Hand’s opinions as “familiar to every lawyer and law student”). 
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calculation13 that fell more than $50,000 short of the short-swing profits 
that would have been found by the Smolowe formula. Perhaps 
overwhelmed by the prospect of checking the sums, the plaintiff 
stipulated to the defendant’s calculation in the district court and did not 
challenge it on appeal.14 Accordingly, Hand adjudicated Gratz without 
performing a liability calculation or even mentioning the formula.15 
With the benefit of hindsight and subsequent developments in 
computing, the remainder of this Article elucidates the meaning, 
wisdom, and continuing significance of Hand’s mathematical silence in 
Gratz. Part I of this Article sets the stage for this exposition by 
introducing the short-swing liability provisions of section 16(b), the 
Smolowe formula and its shortcomings, and the role Gratz has played in 
sustaining the Smolowe formula.  
Part II of this Article dispels the notion that Gratz in any way supports 
use of the Smolowe formula. Section II.A harmonizes the Second 
Circuit’s adjudication of liability in Smolowe and Gratz and shows that 
Hand rightly did not read Smolowe to require use of the formula in 
Gratz. Section II.B explains that Hand wisely based his affirmance on 
Gratz’s acquiescence in the judgment below and not on the master’s 
putative adoption of the Smolowe formula, thereby devising a form of 
adjudication that might be dubbed “the Learned Hand unformula.” 
Section II.C shows that Gratz could not have corroborated the Smolowe 
formula because the formula was probably not used to calculate 
Claughton’s liability and would have fallen short even if it had been so 
used. 
Part III of this Article explains why courts, attorneys, professors, and 
regulators should stop relying on Gratz to justify the Smolowe formula’s 
use beyond its valid and intended range. Section III.A proves the 
Smolowe court’s assertion that the formula maximizes profit recovery 
from trades within a single statutory six-month period, obviating six 
decades of unjustified reliance on Gratz for empirical corroboration of 
the formula. Section III.B extends and formalizes Jacobs’s results by 
showing that the formula may fall short of calculating the maximum 
short-swing profit by up to fifty percent in the worst case. Section III.C 
brings Jacobs’s hypotheticals into the real world by describing a more 
recent case where the Smolowe formula’s fallibility led to a diminished 
recovery. 
                                                     
13 See Def.’s Exhibit C to Gratz Master’s Report, supra note 11. 
14 See Gratz, 187 F.2d at 52. 
15 See generally id. 
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It will not be easy to disrupt the six decades of case law and legal 
teaching that have perpetuated overreliance on the Smolowe formula. A 
leading treatise calls the formula “so firmly ingrained in the fabric of 
Section 16(b) that there is virtually no chance a court will deviate from it 
in the absence of a statutory or rule change to the contrary.”16 Part IV of 
this Article describes two potentially disruptive efforts. Section IV.A 
introduces a free online calculator on the author’s website that should 
facilitate and encourage a more limited reading of Smolowe in future 
short-swing liability proceedings and in law school classrooms. Section 
IV.B discusses the prospect of legal change through the Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s petition for rulemaking and request for amicus 
participation processes. The Article concludes by summarizing its 
central insight about Gratz.  
I. PRELIMINARIES 
A. Short-Swing Liability Under Section 16(b) 
The Securities Exchange Act of 193417 aims to “insure the 
maintenance of fair and honest markets” by, inter alia, regulating 
transactions by officers, directors, and principal owners.18 As a deterrent 
to unfair insider trading,19 section 16(b) of the Act allows a corporation, 
or a shareholder suing on the corporation’s behalf, to recover any “short-
swing” profit realized by an officer, director, or ten percent beneficial 
owner from any purchase or sale, or sale and purchase, of its stock 
within any period of less than six months.20 
                                                     
16 See PETER J. ROMEO & ALAN L. DYE, SECTION 16 TREATISE AND REPORTING GUIDE § 11.02, 
at 11-16 (1994). 
17 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78b. (2012).  
18 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2012). 
19 See H.R. REP. NO. 1383, at 13 (1934) (“Men charged with the administration of other people’s 
money must not use inside information for their own advantage.”). 
20 Section 16(b) provides in relevant part: 
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been obtained by 
such [more than ten percent] beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship 
to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, 
of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security) or a security-based swap 
agreement involving any such equity security within any period of less than six months, unless 
such security or security-based swap agreement was acquired in good faith in connection with a 
debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any 
intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such 
transaction of holding the security or security-based swap agreement purchased or of not 
repurchasing the security or security-based swap agreement sold for a period exceeding six 
months. Suit to recover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of 
competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name 
and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days 
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Section 16(b) is a strict liability provision in two respects. First, it 
“requires insiders to disgorge these ‘short-swing’ profits ‘even if they 
did not trade on inside information or intend to profit on the basis of 
such information.’”21 Second, it allows the corporation to recover the 
maximum profit calculated from the matching of “any purchase and sale, 
or any sale and purchase . . . within any period of less than six 
months,”22 even if the insider incurred a net loss from other trading 
during the pertinent period.23 In effect, section 16(b) demands that the 
insider “pay the maximum after-the-fact value that inside information 
concerning [short-term changes in the price of] the stock could have had, 
given his stock transactions[,]”24 regardless of whether or how he 
actually used that information.25 It thereby encourages insiders to 
manage their companies “in ways that will cause steady appreciation of 
stock prices,” while “depriv[ing] them of trading opportunities that 
might lead them to manage corporate affairs in ways that will cause 
prices to fluctuate or decline.”26 
                                                                                                                      
after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter; but no such suit shall be 
brought more than two years after the date such profit was realized. 
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2010). 
21 Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1414, 1417 (2012) 
(quoting Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 122 (1991)). 
22 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2012); see Smolowe v. Delendo Corp, 136 F.2d 231, 237 (2d Cir. 1943) 
(“The fact that purchases and sales may be thus coupled, regardless of the intent of the 
insider . . . points to an arbitrary matching to achieve the showing of a maximum profit.”). 
23 See Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 847 (2d Cir. 1959) (“The argument that losses and profits 
made by defendant . . . should be matched against each other to determine liability must be 
answered in the negative . . . .”); see, e.g., Donna Darm, Short-Swing Profits in Failed Takeover 
Bids—The Role of Section 16(b), 59 WASH. L. REV. 895, 912 (1984) (arguing that section 16(b) 
punishes unsuccessful takeover bids too harshly); Park McGinty, Replacing Hostile Takeovers, 144 
U. PA. L. REV. 983, 1061 n.205 (1996) (citation omitted) (referring to Gratz as “the most famous 
example of the draconian character of [section 16(b)]’s ‘mechanical’ provisions”). 
24 See Robert L. Davis, Note, Tax Treatment of Section 16(b) Payments, 27 STAN. L. REV. 143, 
150 (1974). 
25 See Kern Cty. Land Co. v. Occidental Petrol. Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 609 (1973) (“You hold the 
director, irrespective of any intention or expectation to sell the security within 6 months after, 
because it will be absolutely impossible to prove the existence of such intention or expectation, and 
you have to have this crude rule of thumb, because you cannot undertake the burden of having to 
prove that the director intended, at the time he bought, to get out on a short swing.”) (quoting 
Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d 
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 15 at 6557 (1934) (statement of principal drafter Thomas G. Corcoran)). 
Section 16(b)’s harshness has long been controversial. Ellen Taylor, Teaching an Old Law New 
Tricks: Rethinking Section 16, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1315, 1318 (1997) (arguing that section 16(b) 
should be repealed because it is ineffective, unfair, and expensive).  
26 Steve Thel, The Genius of Section 16: Regulating the Management of Publicly Held 
Companies, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 391, 411 (1991).  
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Short-swing profit recoveries can be considerable. For example, 
during the internet bubble of the late 1990s, InfoSpace, Inc.’s CEO 
Naveen Jain inflated the company’s value to more than $31 billion27 and 
cashed out millions of his own shares before the stock price plunged.28 A 
shareholder successfully sued Jain on behalf of the company29 under 
section 16(b), and Jain was ordered to disgorge more than $247 million 
in trading profits and prejudgment interest.30 
B. The Smolowe Formula and Its Potential Shortcomings 
Given a lengthy sequence of stock transactions, there can be many 
ways of matching purchases and sales to calculate profits recoverable 
under section 16(b). Since the Second Circuit’s decision in Smolowe v. 
Delendo Corp., 31 courts have generally used the “lowest price in, 
highest price out” formula32 to calculate short-swing profits.33 This 
formula consists of iteratively “matching off against each other the 
shares purchased at the lowest price during the period [of less than six 
                                                     
27 See David Heath & Sharon Pian Chan, Dot-Con Job: How InfoSpace Took Its Investors for a 
Ride, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 6, 2005), http://www.seattletimes.com/business/dot-con-job-how-
infospace-took-its-investors-for-a-ride/ [https://perma.cc/FT3T-J6NX]. 
28 See David Heath & Sharon Pian Chan, When Times Got Tough, Execs Hid Troubles, Dumped 
Stock, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 7, 2005), http://www.seattletimes.com/business/when-times-got-tough-
execs-hid-troubles-dumped-stock/ (last visited Dec. 7, 2016). 
29 See Dreiling ex rel. Infospace v. Kellett, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1217 (W.D. Wash. 2003) 
(discussing Dreiling’s suit against Jain and co-defendants on behalf of InfoSpace). 
30 See id. at 1242 (ordering disgorgement of $202,551,696.05 in profits and $44,571,016.92 in 
prejudgment interest for a total judgment of $247,122,712.97). The company eventually settled with 
the Jains for approximately $83 million. Press Release, InfoSpace, Inc., Settlement Agreement 
Reached in InfoSpace Derivative Case, Section 16(b) Case, and Certain Related Cases Brought by 
the Jains (Dec. 22, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1068875/000119312504219392 
/dex991.htm [https://perma.cc/628X-66ZD]. 
31 See 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1941). 
32 See id. at 239 (describing the formula succinctly as “lowest price in, highest price out—within 
six months—as applied by the district court”). 
33 See, e.g., Dreiling, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 1239 (“Consistent with the definition of profit and the 
‘lowest in, highest out’ rule, therefore, the Jains’ profit is calculated at $202,551,696.05.”). The 
court’s calculation was simplified—and arguably inflated—by the fact that it attributed a purchase 
price of zero to shares of company stock Jain had transferred into his family’s brokerage accounts. 
See id. at 1239; Brief of Sec. and Exch. Comm’n as Amicus Curiae at 12–13, Dreiling ex rel. 
Infospace v. Kellett, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (No. 03-35710) (criticizing the 
court’s characterization of the transfer). Jain was held liable for the entire proceeds of 
$85,600,000.00, $17,955,000.00, and $98,966,696.05 from three corresponding sales of company 
stock made within two months of the transfer, for a total liability of $202,551,696.05. See Dreiling, 
281 F. Supp. 2d at 1237–39. 
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months] and an equal number of shares sold at the highest price or prices 
during the [same] period.”34  
                                                     
34  Brief of Sec. and Exch. Comm’n as Amicus Curiae at 3, Smolowe v. Delendo Corp, 136 F.2d 
231 (2d Cir. 1943) (No. 191) [hereinafter SEC Smolowe Brief]; see id. at 4–5 (containing the full 
original statement of the formula). 
In Smolowe, the defendant Kaplan purchased 15,800 shares from co-defendant I.J. Seskis on 
April 4, 1940 for $2.25 per share, or $35,550. See Smolowe I, 46 F. Supp. 758, 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). 
Of these, 15,583 were acquired in connection with a prior debt and were therefore exempt from 
section 16(b) liability. See id. at 766. In addition to his purchase from Seskis, Kaplan conducted the 
following transactions during the period in question: 
Date Transaction Shares Amount ($) Price ($)/Share 
12/1/1939 Purchase 5000 7,750.00 1.5500 
2/5/1940 Purchase 200 285.00 1.4250 
2/15/1940 Sale 200 308.91 1.5446 
2/20/1940 Purchase 200 335.00 1.6750 
3/25/1940 Purchase 400 924.00 2.3100 
3/27/1940 Purchase 1,000 2,560.00 2.5600 
4/11/1940 Purchase 300 768.00 2.5600 
4/16/1940 Sale 15,800 35,550.00 2.2500 
4/19/1940 Sale 500 750.00 1.5000 
4/22/1940 Sale 500 1,312.50 2.6250 
5/7/1940 Sale 200 525.00 2.6250 
5/7/1940 Sale 800 2,000.00 2.5000 
5/10/1940 Sale 500 1,040.20 2.0804 
5/11/1940 Sale 200 250.00 1.2500 
5/13/1940 Sale 2,000 7,779.03 3.8895 
5/14/1940 Sale 1,000 3,889.52 3.8895 
See id. at 762. 
Using the Commission’s “lowest-in, highest-out” formula, the district court matched Kaplan’s 
transactions as follows. First, the court identified the 200 shares purchased on February 5, 1940 as 
the shares purchased at the lowest price per share ($1.4250) during the period. The court matched 
these shares with 200 of the 1,000 shares sold on May 14, 1940 at the highest price per share 
($3.8895) during the period. The matching process continued as shown below, yielding a total profit 
of $9,161.05: 
Shares Purchase Date Cost ($) Sale Date Proceeds ($) Profit ($) 
200 2/5/1940 $ 285.00 5/14/1940 777.90 492.90 
800 12/1/1939 1,240.00 5/14/1940 3,111.62 1,871.62 
2,000 12/1/1939 3,100.00 5/13/1940 7,779.03 4,679.03 
500 12/1/1939 775.00 4/22/1940 1,312.50 537.50 
200 12/1/1939 310.00 5/7/1940 525.00 215.00 
800 12/1/1939 1,240.00 5/7/1940 2,000.00 760.00 
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The Smolowe formula is capable of producing results that fall short of the 
maximum possible profit. In a 1987 article35 that would become his section 
16 treatise,36 Jacobs provided hypothetical examples to illustrate that the 
formula may fail to recover the maximum possible short-swing profit when 
some trades are not within the statute of limitations37 and when trades span a 
period of more than six months.38 Figure 1 depicts Jacobs’s example of the 
                                                                                                                      
Shares Purchase Date Cost ($) Sale Date Proceeds ($) Profit ($) 
500 12/1/1939 775.00 4/16/1940 1,125.00 350.00 
200 12/1/1939 310.00 4/16/1940 450.00 140.00 
200 2/20/1940 335.00 4/16/1940 450.00 115.00 
See id. at 766 (noting in supplemental opinion that only paired transactions resulting in profit should 
be included in calculation). 
35 Jacobs, supra note 7. Neither Jacobs nor the author is aware of any earlier acknowledgment of 
the Smolowe formula’s limitations in the literature, and Jacobs claims credit for discovering them. 
Personal communication with Arnold S. Jacobs. 
36 ARNOLD S. JACOBS, SECTION 16 OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT (2011). 
37 Jacobs’s example considers a suit filed in month 28 attacking the following trading sequence: 
Month 
Shares 
Purchased 
Purchase Price ($) 
Per Share Shares Sold 
Sale Price ($) 
Per Share 
1 1,000 10   
2 1,000 12   
3   1,000 17 
5   1,000 15 
The Smolowe formula would pair the purchases in months 1 and 2 with the sales in months 3 and 
5, respectively; however, the statute of limitations would bar recovery of profits from the former 
pair of transactions, leaving only the $3,000 proceeds from the latter pair. A higher profit of $5,000 
can be calculated by instead pairing the purchases in months 1 and 2 with the sales in month 5 and 
3, respectively. See Jacobs, supra note 7, at 533–34.  
38 Jacobs’s example uses the following trading sequence: 
Month 
Shares 
Purchased 
Purchase Price ($) 
Per Share Shares Sold 
Sale Price ($) 
Per Share 
1 1,000 10   
5   1,000 12 
8 1,000 8 1,000 13 
9 1,000 9 1,000 11 
The Smolowe formula produces a total profit of $8,000 by pairing the purchases in months 8 and 
9 with the sales in months 8 and 5, respectively (leaving the transactions in months 1 and 9, which 
are too far apart to be paired). A higher profit of $9,000 can be calculated by instead pairing the 
purchases in 1, 8 and 9 with the sales in 5, 8 and 9, respectively. See id. at 532–33; Andrew Chin, 
Accurate Calculation of Short-Swing Profits Under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 587, 596–99 (1997) (providing another example); supra Figure 1. 
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Smolowe formula’s failure to maximize recovery from a sequence of trades 
spanning an eight-month period. 
 
Figure 1: 
Hypothetical example of a trading sequence spanning more than 
six months for which the Smolowe formula falls short of calculating 
the maximum possible short-swing profit to be disgorged to the 
company. After the Smolowe formula (left) respectively matches the 
two lowest-priced purchases with the two highest-priced sales within 
less than six months, the remaining transactions are more than six 
months apart and cannot be matched for a recoverable profit. To 
achieve the maximum recovery (right), it is necessary to depart from 
the matching prescribed by the “lowest-in, highest-out” formula. 
 
Even though the Smolowe formula cannot be reliably applied to 
trading sequences spanning more than six months, not every long trading 
sequence results in a shortfall, as Figure 2 illustrates. 
Figure 2: 
Trading sequence spanning more than six months for which the 
Smolowe formula correctly calculates the maximum recovery. 
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Regardless of what formula is used, trades spanning more than one 
statutory six-month period pose complications for section 16(b) liability 
calculations that were not before the Smolowe court, as Figure 3 illustrates.39 
Figure 3: 
Six-month short-swing trading periods in Smolowe’s trading 
sequence and in a hypothetical trading sequence. All of the trades 
challenged in Smolowe (left) occurred within a single statutory six-
month period. Even with fewer trades, the hypothetical sequence (right) 
presents a more complex section 16(b) liability calculation problem 
because the transaction dates span a period of more than six months. 
 
C. The Ubiquity of the Smolowe Formula and the Misreading of Gratz 
Despite the Smolowe formula’s computational complications and 
discrepancies in trading sequences extending beyond the statute of 
limitations40 and spanning more than six months,41 courts have not 
hesitated to apply the formula in these potentially problematic 
situations,42 and courts43 and commentators44 have described the 
                                                     
39 See also ROMEO & DYE, supra note 16, § 10.01[2], at 10-5 (describing possible matchings of 
transactions in overlapping six-month periods). 
40 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
41 See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. 
42 See, e.g., Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 847–48 (2d Cir. 1959) (spanning more than seven 
months); Donoghue v. Casual Male Retail Group, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 2d 226, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(spanning more than ten months); Segen v. Westcliff Capital Mgmt., LLC, 299 F. Supp. 2d 262, 
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Smolowe formula in unqualified terms as a correct method for 
maximizing recovery in all section 16(b) cases. As one treatise puts it, 
                                                                                                                      
265–66, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (spanning more than ten months); Donoghue v. MIRACOR 
Diagnostics, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 6696, 2002 WL 233188, at *1–3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2002) (spanning 
more than thirteen months); Morales v. New Valley Corp., 999 F. Supp. 470, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 
(spanning more than six months); Morales v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 443 F. Supp. 778, 780 (W.D. Pa. 
1978) (three purchases made more than two years prior to suit); Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 222 F. 
Supp. 831, 837 (D.N.J. 1963) (spanning more than nine months), modified, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 
1965); Ark. La. Gas Co. v. W.R. Stephens Inv. Co., 141 F. Supp. 841, 847–48 (W.D. Ark. 1956) 
(spanning more than thirteen months); Kogan v. Schulte, 61 F. Supp. 604, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) 
(spanning fifteen months). 
43 See, e.g., Credit Suisse Secs. LLC v. Simmonds, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1414, 1418–21 (2011); 
Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516, 532–33 (9th Cir. 1981) (“We believe the Smolowe rule 
is in accord with the absolute and thoroughgoing nature of liability under § 16(b). This statute is 
intended to be a deterrent to a type of activity which Congress realized was subject to much abuse. 
In some cases the Smolowe rule can be criticized for harshness and artificiality. But other methods 
would be equally artificial. The Smolowe rule assures full recovery of profits for the corporation.”); 
Morales v. Lukens, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1209, 1213 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (quoting Blau v. Lehman, 286 
F.2d 786, 791 (2d Cir. 1960), aff’d 368 U.S. 403 (1962)) (“The purpose of the [lowest-in, highest-
out] rule is to ‘squeeze every penny of profit’ from the defendant.”); Roth v. Jennings, No. 03 Civ. 
7760(DAB), 2009 WL 1440670, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2009) (citing Nat. Microsystems Corp., 
198 F. Supp. 2d at 492 (“[T]he lowest-in, highest-out rule maximizes damages to be assessed 
against a short-swing trader, rendering potential losses that might otherwise be recognized 
irrelevant.”)); Segen ex rel. KFX Inc. v. Westcliff Capital Mgmt., LLC, 299 F. Supp. 2d 262, 272 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir. 1943)) (“[T]he 
trades must be matched in a manner that maximizes the disgorgeable amount to [the issuer]. This is 
accomplished by matching the highest sale prices with the lowest purchase prices within the six 
month period.”); Mayer v. Chesapeake Ins. Co. Ltd., 877 F.2d 1154, 1164 (2nd Cir. 1989) (citing 
Smolowe, 136 F.2d at 239); Synalloy Corp. v. Gray, 816 F. Supp. 963, 971 (D. Del. 1993) (citing 
Mayer, 877 F.2d at 1164); Dreiling ex rel. Infospace v. Kellett, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1238–39 
(W.D. Wash. 2003) (citing Whittaker, 639 F.2d at 533); Casual Male Retail Group,,375 F. Supp. 2d 
at 237 (citing Donoghue v. Nat. Microsystems Corp., 198 F. Supp. 2d at 492); Huppe v. Special 
Situations Fund III QP, L.P., 565 F. Supp. 2d 495, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Nat. Microsystems 
Corp., 198 F. Supp. 2d 487). 
44 See, e.g., WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 9, at 924 n.12 (“The formula established [in 
Smolowe] matches the lowest price in with the highest price out, thus ensuring recovery of all 
possible profits.”); Robert L. Davis, Note, Tax Treatment of Section 16(b) Payments, 27 STAN. L. 
REV. 143, 150 (1974) (citing Smolowe, 136 F.2d 231) (“Only by computing the ‘profit’ in this 
manner is all potential for trading on inside information within a six-month period removed.”); 
Michael Rosenzweig, Note, Section 16(b) Liability for Profits Realized from a Cash Purchase and 
Sale Within Six Months of the Securities of Two Issuers Involved in an Intervening Reorganization, 
75 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1326 n.23 (1975) (citing Smolowe, 136 F.2d at 239) (“Had another 
method of calculation been chosen, liability for violation of the section would not be as great.”); 
Steve Thel, The Genius of Section 16: Regulating the Management of Publicly Held Companies, 42 
HASTINGS L.J. 391, 404 & n.36 (1991) (stating that through Smolowe’s “lowest-in, highest-out” 
formula, “[t]he courts have given section 16(b) teeth by computing profit so as to maximize the 
forfeiture”); Timothy Tomlinson, The Application of Section 16(b) to Tax-Qualified Employee 
Benefit Plans, 33 STAN. L. REV. 231, 232 n.7 (1981) (citing Smolowe, 136 F.2d 231) (“‘Profits’ are 
normally calculated so as to recover the maximum amount from trading insiders. Thus, the highest 
sale price is matched with the lowest purchase price within the 6-month period.”). 
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the Smolowe formula “has reigned supreme” among methods for 
calculating short-swing profits.45 
One of famed jurist Learned Hand’s final decisions as an active judge,46 
Gratz v. Claughton, has been instrumental in the Smolowe formula’s 
ubiquity. Casebooks have used Gratz to introduce three generations of law 
students to short-swing profit calculation,47 often in connection with 
problems or worked examples to illustrate the Smolowe formula’s 
operation.48 Of the many section 16(b) cases that could be used for this 
purpose, Gratz stands out both for its author’s illuminating analysis49 and 
                                                     
45 See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 9, at 693. 
46 Learned Hand retired from active status on May 15, 1951, but continued to serve as a senior 
judge until his death in 1961. See GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 
504–05, 548–49 (1994). Hand’s significance in American jurisprudence is unquestioned. See 
HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF U.S. SUPREME COURT 
APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II 45 (5th ed. 2008) (“To date, Learned Hand served 
longer, a total of 52 years, and arguably, perhaps with more distinction, than any other federal jurist 
in our history.”); James A. Thomson, Learned Hand: Evaluating a Federal Judge, 22 N. KY. L. 
REV. 763, 794 (1995) (“Unanimity prevails on one proposition: Hand’s influence on American law 
was wide and deep.”). 
47 See, e.g., WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATION 627 (3d ed. 2009) (note case); WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 593–97 (concise 6th ed. 1988) (principal case); JAMES 
D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES & MATERIALS 894 (4th ed. 2004) (note case); 
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG & JAMES D. COX, CORPORATIONS & OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: 
CASES & MATERIALS 1009–12 (10th ed. 2011) (principal case); ALEXANDER H. FREY ET AL., CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 762–64 (1966) (principal case); ROBERT W. HAMILTON, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY 
COMPANIES 1001–02 (7th ed. 2001) (note case); THOMAS LEE HAZEN & JERRY W. MARKHAM, 
CORPORATIONS & OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 887–90 (standard 3d ed. 2009) (note case); 
NORMAN D. LATTIN ET AL., CORPORATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS 695–700 (4th ed. 1968) 
(principal case); VAGTS, supra note 2, at 551–53 n.7 (note case); see generally Gunther, supra note 
12, at 47 (describing Hand’s opinions as “familiar to every lawyer and law student”). 
48 See, e.g., ALLEN, supra note 47, at 629 (exercise); CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 47, at 598 
(example); COX, supra note 47, at 894–95 (exercise); EISENBERG & COX, supra note 47, at 1013 
(examples); HAMILTON, supra note 47, at 1000–03; HAZEN & MARKHAM, supra note 47, at 889 
(exercises); VAGTS, supra note 47, at 562 (exercise). 
49 See JOHN R. VILE, 1 GREAT AMERICAN JUDGES: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 319 (2003) (Judge Hand 
“has been quoted in Supreme Court opinions and scholarly publications more often than any lower 
court judge in the United States. . . . He could take a mass of cases, unorganized splinters and shards 
of ideas, and painstakingly fit them into a glittering stained glass window that illuminated an entire 
field for the rest of the legal world”); THE ART AND CRAFT OF JUDGING: THE DECISIONS OF JUDGE 
LEARNED HAND 1 (Hershel Shanks ed. 1968) (“[F]requently, a case attained significance because 
the opinion was written by Learned Hand—because of his ability to fathom the principle on which 
decision depended and illuminate its meaning. In this way, he created his legacy: a light for the 
future, to guide lawyers and judges in applying the law to cases yet unborn.”). 
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for its draconian judgment of $300,000 against an insider who had 
already suffered a net overall loss of $400,000.50 
Courts have also widely cited Gratz in connection with the formula. 
Along with Smolowe, Gratz has been cited as one of the two leading 
authorities for the formula’s use in section 16(b) decisions spanning 
from the 1950s to the present day.51 Commentators have followed suit.52 
                                                     
50 See Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 847–48, (2d Cir. 1959) (citing Gratz v. Claughton, 187 
F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1951)); COX & HILLMAN, supra note 47, at 894 (citing Gratz, 187 F.2d at 52–53) 
(“Under this [lowest-in, highest-out] approach, an insider can be liable for large amounts of profits, 
even where he lost money on his purchase and sale activity in the aggregate.”); EISENBERG & COX, 
supra note 47, at 1014 (noting that the “Smolowe/Gratz formula” may impose liability based on the 
mere “possibility” that a defendant may have profited by limiting his loss through the use of inside 
information); Park McGinty, Replacing Hostile Takeovers, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 983, 1061 n.205 
(1996) (citation omitted) (referring to Gratz as “the most famous example of the draconian character 
of [section 16(b)]’s ‘mechanical’ provisions”). 
51 See, e.g., Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516, 531 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Smolowe v. 
Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943)); Anderson v. Comm’r, 480 F.2d 1304, 1307 (7th Cir. 
1973) (same); Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 847–48 (2d Cir. 1959) (same); Falco v. Donner 
Found., 208 F.2d 600, 602 (2d Cir. 1953) (same); Gratz, 187 F.2d 46, abrogated on other grounds, 
Credit Suisse Secs. LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414, 1418–21 (2012); Huppe v. Special 
Situations Fund III, 565 F. Supp. 2d 495, 502–03 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Gratz, 187 F.2d 46); 
Donoghue v. Casual Male Retail Grp., Inc., 375 F. Supp. 2d 226, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (same); 
Donoghue v. MIRACOR Diagnostics, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 6696, 2002 WL 233188, at *1–3 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 11, 2002) (same); Donoghue v. Nat. Microsystems Corp., 198 F. Supp. 2d 487, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002) (same); Tyco Labs., Inc. v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 1, 9 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) 
(same); Lewis v. Levinson, 77 Civ. 1481, 1978 WL 1087, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 1978) (same); 
Lewis v. Riklis, 446 F. Supp. 582, 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (same); Makofsky v. Ultra Dynamics Corp., 
383 F. Supp. 631, 638–39 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (same); W. Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 
231 F. Supp. 456, 460–61 (D. Minn. 1964) (same), rev’d on other grounds, 348 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 
1965); Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 222 F. Supp. 831, 837 (D.N.J. 1963) (same); Kornfeld v. Eaton, 
217 F. Supp. 671, 673–74 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (same); Blau v. Lehman, 173 F. Supp. 590, 595 n.3 
(S.D.N.Y. 1959) (same); Ark. La. Gas Co. v. W.R. Stephens Inv. Co., 141 F. Supp. 841, 847 (W.D. 
Ark. 1956) (same). See generally EISENBERG & COX, supra note 47, at 1013 (“The formula adopted 
in Smolowe and Gratz has been generally approved by the courts.”); VAGTS, supra note 47, at 552 
(“Opinions by the Second Circuit in the Section 16 field are generally regarded as authoritative.”). 
Unlike many of the liability calculations discussed in this Article, the calculation of Jain’s 
liability was trivially simple, see supra note 33, and relied on Gratz only indirectly. See Dreiling ex 
rel. Infospace v. Kellett, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1238 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (citing Whittaker, 639 F.2d 
at 522, 533); Whittaker, 639 F.2d at 531 (citing Gratz, 187 F.2d at 50–52). 
52 See, e.g., LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 9, at 694 (“Eight years later [in Gratz] the Second 
Circuit reasserted the lowest-in, highest-out formula after independent analysis.”); ROMEO & DYE, 
supra note 16, at 11-8 (1994) (“The ‘lowest-in, highest-out” method was reasserted, with 
independent analysis, by the Second Circuit in [Gratz].”); Donald C. Cook & Myer Feldman, 
Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARV. L. REV. 612, 614 n.151 (1953) 
(stating that Gratz reaffirmed the Smolowe formula); Michael H. Dessent, Weapons to Fight Insider 
Trading in the 21st Century: A Call for the Repeal of Section 16(b), 33 AKRON L. REV. 481, 481 n.3 
(2000) (“The [Gratz] court followed Smolowe . . . , which stated that to give section 16(b) its full 
effect, the calculation would be the shares with the lowest purchase price, matched against those 
with the highest sale prices.”); Maureen S. Duggan, Annotation, Proper Measure and Elements of 
Recovery for Insider Short-Swing Transaction, 86 A.L.R. FED. 16, §  4 (1988) (“In Gratz . . . the 
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This historically dominant reading of Gratz has always been strained 
at best. Hand did cite Smolowe53 and agreed with its strict approach to 
fiduciary liability,54 but he said nothing about the Smolowe formula, did 
not use it, and did not even comment on the calculations in the record on 
appeal: “the plaintiff has not appealed, so that she is not entitled to any 
more than she has recovered. On this account we have not examined the 
[special] master’s computations in detail and are not to be understood to 
have passed upon them.”55 Hand may have been famously fond of 
algebra,56 but in Gratz, he skipped the math.57 
As the remainder of this Article will show, recent developments in 
computer science and technology have brought to light the meaning and 
wisdom of Hand’s mathematical silence in Gratz. By “examin[ing] the 
[special] master’s computations in detail,” today’s computers can 
determine that the Smolowe formula was probably not used to calculate 
defendant Edward N. Claughton’s short-swing profits and would have 
fallen short of maximizing those profits even if it had been used (section 
II.C). Modern computer science has also made it possible to characterize 
the Smolowe formula’s worst-case errors (section III.B) and to identify a 
                                                                                                                      
court affirmed the adoption of the lowest in-highest out rule for computing short-swing profits when 
there are multiple purchases and sales . . . .”); Roger J. George, Jr., Comment, The Application of 
Section 16(b) to Mergers: A Hidden Hazard, 47 TEX. L. REV. 1417, 1421 n.34 (1969) (same); 
Robert W. Hamilton, Convertible Securities and Section 16(b): The End of an Era, 44 TEX. L. REV. 
1447, 1448 n.7 (1966) (citing Gratz, 187 F.2d 46, as authority for the formula); Timothy Tomlinson, 
Section 16(b): A Single Analysis of Purchases and Sales—Merging the Objective and Pragmatic 
Analyses, 1981 DUKE L.J. 941, 941 n.5 (1981) (same); Rosenzweig, supra note 44, at 1326 n.23 
(same); Recent Development, Second Circuit Limits Insider-Partner’s 16(b) Liability, 14 STAN. L. 
REV. 192, 194 n.10 (1961) (same); but cf. ARNOLD S. JACOBS, SECTION 16 OF THE SECURITIES 
EXCHANGE ACT 531 (2011) (citations omitted) (“[Although it] has been widely cited and 
followed . . . the lowest price in-highest price out rule is not the real holding of Smolowe [or 
Gratz].”). 
53 Gratz, 187 F.2d at 49 n.4, 50, 52 (citing Smolowe, 136 F.2d 231). 
54 See id. at 51–52.  
55 See id. at 52 (emphasis added). 
56 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (“[I]f the probability 
be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L 
multiplied by P: i.e., whether B [less than] PL.”). This algebraic rule is taught to every first-year 
torts student as the “famous Learned Hand formula.” Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in 
Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1080 (2001); see also Patrick J. Kelley, The Carroll Towing 
Company Case and the Teaching of Tort Law, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 731, 732 n.4 (2001) (citing 
casebooks that prominently feature Carroll Towing). It is “arguably the most prominent approach 
used to determine negligence.” Arden Rowell & Jessica Bregant, Numeracy and Legal Decision 
Making, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 191, 215 (2014).  
57 Accordingly, there is no basis for referring to the “lowest-in, highest-out” formula as “[t]he 
formula adopted in Smolowe and Gratz.” See EISENBERG & COX, supra note 47, at 1013; supra 
notes 51–52 (citing cases and commentaries that attribute the formula to Gratz, 187 F.2d 46). 
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costly error from the formula’s use in a recent case (section III.C). Even 
by 1987, Jacobs had shown that the Smolowe formula could not reliably 
be applied to Claughton’s twenty-one month trading sequence.58 In 
1951, however, Hand could not have feasibly calculated the maximum 
value of Claughton’s short-swing profits or assessed the Smolowe 
formula’s accuracy (section II.B). Prudently, Hand adhered to Smolowe’s 
strict fiduciary liability doctrine (section II.A) and resolved the issue of 
Claughton’s liability (section II.B) without prescribing the Smolowe 
formula or any other method of liability calculation. Now that the 
requisite technology is available to calculate and verify an insider’s 
maximum short-swing profits in all cases (section IV.A), there is no 
longer any reason to rely on Gratz (or any other case law) as an authority 
for the Smolowe formula’s use (section III.A). It is time for Hand’s 
mathematical silence to be heard (section IV.B). 
II. THE MEANING OF HAND’S MATHEMATICAL SILENCE 
A. Smolowe and Hand’s Silence in Gratz 
It may seem difficult at first to reconcile Hand’s silence regarding the 
“lowest-in, highest-out” formula in Gratz with the district court’s and Second 
Circuit’s explicit adoption of the “lowest-in, highest-out” formula in 
Smolowe. The two cases, however, presented very different facts. Because 
Gratz involved hundreds of transactions spanning more than twenty-one 
months,59 not all pairs of the defendant’s low-priced purchases and high-
priced sales would yield a recoverable short-swing profit, but only such pairs 
occurring within six months of each other.60 Smolowe involved a far simpler 
sequence of six purchases and nine sales between December 1, 1939 and 
May 14, 194061 (i.e., all within a single statutory six-month period).62 
Smolowe was therefore more amenable to use of the formula than was Gratz, 
                                                     
58 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.  
59 See Gratz Master’s Report, supra note 11 (listing, inter alia, 276 purchases and 101 sales of 
common stock and 11 purchases and 20 sales of preferred stock between December 18, 1944 and 
September 24, 1946). 
60 To be more precise, section 16(b) requires disgorgement of profit “from any purchase and sale, 
or any sale and purchase . . . within any period of less than six months.” 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2012) 
(emphasis added). Neither Smolowe nor Gratz discussed the fine points of measuring the statutory 
six-month period or the implications of section 16(b)’s “less than” provision. See ROMEO & DYE, 
supra note 16, § 10.01, at 10-2 to 10-4 (surveying case law on measuring the short-swing period).  
61 Smolowe I, 46 F. Supp. at 762. 
62 The complaint was filed October 28, 1940, i.e., within the statute of limitations. See Smolowe 
v. Delendo Corp., 36 F. Supp. 790, 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). 
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as Figure 3 suggests, and the adjudication of liability in the two cases 
confirms this theory.  
In Smolowe, the Securities and Exchange Commission filed an amicus 
brief to the district court expressly “confine[d] . . . to a single question—the 
measure of damages to be applied in cases where, as here, numerous 
purchases and sales have been made in differing sized lots and at different 
prices during the period in respect of which relief is sought.”63 The 
Commission proposed the following formula: 
[T]he plaintiff in any case under Section 16(b) is entitled to list in 
one column all purchases made during the period in respect of which 
he seeks relief, and in another column all sales made within the same 
period. As a measure of the recovery to which he is entitled, he may 
start by matching off against each other the shares purchased at the 
lowest price during the period and an equal number of shares sold at 
the highest price or prices during the period, the measure of 
recovery in respect of this “purchase and sale” being the difference 
between the two prices. Then, the purchase price of the shares 
purchased at the next lowest price may be similarly matched off 
against the highest share price of any remaining equal number of 
shares sold during the period. The same process may be continued 
until all shares purchased have been matched off, so far as possible, 
against an equal number of shares sold at higher prices. The gross 
recovery is the sum of the several differentials thus determined.64 
In this definitive statement of the formula,65 each of the italicized 
occurrences of the term “the period” refers to the antecedent term “the period 
in respect of which he seeks relief,” so they are all synonymous. Because it is 
permissible to match shares purchased and shares sold during “the period” 
for a recoverable profit only if the transactions occur within six months of 
each other,66 “the period” logically must refer to a single statutory six-month 
                                                     
63 SEC Smolowe Brief, supra note 34, at 4. 
64 Id. at 4–5 (emphases added). 
65 It bears noting that the “lowest-in, highest-out” formula was first suggested much earlier in two 
preliminary drafts of the 1934 Act. See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 237 n.11 (2d Cir. 
1943) (“H.R. 7852 and S. 2693 contained the provision that ‘profit shall be calculated on the sale or 
sales by such person of such security made at the highest price or prices and on the purchase or 
purchases made by such person of such security at the lowest price or prices during the six months’ 
period . . . .’”). The Smolowe court, however, found these drafts to be minimally relevant to the 
interpretation of the enacted statute, see id., and explicitly affirmed the district court’s adoption of 
the Commission’s version of the formula. See id. at 239; Smolowe I, 46 F. Supp. at 766. Even if the 
draft language were to be taken as definitive, it still refers to a single “six months’ period,” so the 
limited scope of the Commission’s formula would apply to the legislative version of the formula 
with equal force. See Smolowe, 136 F.2d at 237 n. 11.  
66 See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2012).  
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period. The Commission’s formula therefore addresses only cases in which 
“the period in respect of which relief is sought” is a single statutory six-
month period, and says nothing regarding the additional complexities of 
matching transactions that span a longer time frame.67 In particular, the 
Commission’s formula is facially inapplicable to the twenty-one-month 
trading sequence challenged in Gratz. 
In addition to the Commission’s formula, the district court also considered 
defendant Henry C. Kaplan’s alternative proposals to allow only the 
matching of purchases and sales occurring “first in and first out” within the 
trading sequence or involving identical stock certificates.68 After finding 
Kaplan’s proposals inconsistent with section 16(b)’s text and purpose, the 
court immediately proceeded to adopt the Commission’s formula without 
further comment or analysis: 
The subsection [16(b)] carefully states that profits are to be 
computed from “any” purchase and sale or “any” sale and purchase 
within the six months. It does not say that any purchase is to be set 
off against the next sale nor that any rule of “first in and first out” 
shall be adopted. The purpose of the statute was to make 
unprofitable short swings by persons in a position to have inside 
information. If they saw fit to disobey the law, there is no reason 
why the recovery should be minimized. The rule to be adopted must 
disregard the identity of the certificates, as I have previously stated. 
The computation suggested by the Securities & Exchange 
Commission is, therefore, adopted as fixing the amount of profits 
recoverable from the defendant Kaplan.69 
The Second Circuit, in an affirmance authored by Judge Charles Edward 
Clark, similarly found Kaplan’s proposals inconsistent with section 16(b)’s 
                                                     
67 See supra Figure 3 (illustrating that longer transaction sequences give rise to multiple partially 
overlapping statutory six-month periods within which pairs of transactions can be matched for a 
recoverable profit). The following example illustrates the complexity introduced by overlapping 
short-swing periods: 
A plaintiff may match transactions in overlapping six-month periods. Suppose, for example, 
that an insider makes a purchase of 100 shares of stock on January 1, followed by a sale of 300 
shares on May 1 and a purchase of 200 shares on September 30. Both the purchase on January 
1 and the purchase on September 30 may be matched with the sale on May 1. The period from 
January 1 through June 29 may be considered one short-swing period, permitting the January 1 
purchase to be matched with the sale of 100 of the shares sold on May 1. Similarly, the period 
from May 1 through October 30 may be considered a separate short-swing period, permitting 
the May 1 sale of the remaining 200 shares to be matched with the September 30 purchase. 
However, if the two purchases exceeded 300 shares (the number of shares sold), only 300 
shares would be matched. 
ROMEO & DYE, supra note 16, § 10.01[2], at 10-5 (citation omitted). 
68 Smolowe I, 46 F. Supp. at 766. 
69 Id. 
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“any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase” provision.70 Clark drew an 
even stronger conclusion from the statute’s expansive language, finding that 
“its generality permits and points to . . . . an arbitrary matching to achieve the 
showing of a maximum profit.”71 Clark then proceeded to set forth the “only 
rule” that would recover the maximum profit attributable to an insider’s stock 
transactions: 
We must suppose that the statute was intended to be thorough-
going, to squeeze all possible profits out of stock transactions, and 
thus to establish a standard so high as to prevent any conflict 
between the selfish interest of a fiduciary officer, director, or 
stockholder and the faithful performance of his duty. The only rule 
whereby all possible profits can be surely recovered is that of lowest 
price in, highest price out—within six months—as applied by the 
district court. We affirm it here, defendants having failed to suggest 
another more reasonable rule.72 
Clark explicitly identified “[t]he only rule whereby all possible profits can 
be surely recovered” as the formula “applied by the district court” in 
Smolowe: namely, the formula “suggested by the Securities & Exchange 
Commission.”73 Accordingly, the instruction “lowest price in, highest price 
out”74 was simply an elegantly succinct paraphrase of the Commission’s 
formula for matching off “the shares purchased at the lowest price during the 
period and an equal number of shares sold at the highest price or prices 
during the period.”75 The accompanying qualifier “within six months”76 
referred to the statutory six-month period during which all of the challenged 
transactions occurred, as set forth in the Commission’s formula.77 
                                                     
70 Smolowe, 136 F.2d at 237–38. 
71 Id. at 237. 
72 Id. at 239 (citations omitted). 
73 Smolowe I, 46 F. Supp. at 766. 
74 Smolowe, 136 F.2d at 239. 
75 See SEC Smolowe Brief, supra note 34, at 4–5. 
76 Smolowe, 136 F.2d at 239. 
77 SEC Smolowe Brief, supra note 34, at 3 (emphasis added). By 1981, the Smolowe formula had 
been employed in enough cases involving longer trading sequences that the Commission 
reinterpreted the “within six months” provision as referring to each pair of matched transactions, 
rather than the length of the entire trading sequence. See Interpretive Release on Rules Applicable to 
Insider Reporting and Trading, 46 Fed. Reg. 48147, 48161 n.102 (1981) (citing Smolowe, 136 F.2d 
231) (stating that “profit is computed by matching the highest sale price with the lowest purchase 
price within six months, the next highest sale price with the next lowest purchase price within six 
months, and so on, until all shares have been included in the computation”). As the foregoing 
discussion has shown, this reinterpretation has no basis in Smolowe. 
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The Smolowe formula “lowest price in, highest price out—within six 
months”78 therefore amounted to nothing more or less than the 
Commission’s formula,79 which in turn was designed and proposed for use 
only in cases involving a single statutory six-month trading period.80 Thus, 
despite Clark’s sua sponte reference to the formula as “[t]he only rule,”81 and 
contrary to the dominant reading of Smolowe,82 the Smolowe court did not 
endorse the formula for application to the twenty-one-month trading 
sequence challenged in Gratz.83 
Gratz involved a sequence of more than 400 transactions in Missouri-
Kansas-Texas Railroad Company stock spanning from December 18, 1944 
to September 24, 1946.84 In district court proceedings before a special 
master, the plaintiff Stella Gratz had sought liability under the Smolowe 
formula.85 The defendant Edward N. Claughton had argued for more lenient 
methods of calculation, including a modification of the Smolowe formula 
involving “matching the highest prices out against the lowest prices in for 
three months before or three months after each sale.”86 The master rejected 
Claughton’s alternative proposals because they did not “conform to or satisfy 
the statute as I view it, or the rule of damages in the Smolowe case which I 
find plaintiffs have correctly adopted.”87 
Claughton had also submitted various calculations, including an 
accounting purporting to show: 
[T]he damages, though not conceding the correctness of the theory 
of such calculation, which might be awarded to the plaintiffs, in the 
sum of [$308,417], upon the basis of highest price out and lowest 
price in during the period of his trading, as to purchases and sales 
                                                     
78 Smolowe, 136 F.2d at 239. 
79 See SEC Smolowe Brief, supra note 34, at 4–5. 
80 Id.  
81 Smolowe, 136 F.2d at 239. 
82 See, e.g., Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516, 533 (9th Cir. 1981), abrogated on other 
grounds by Credit Suisse Secs. LLC v. Simmonds, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1414, 1418–21 (2011) 
(stating without qualification that “[t]he Smolowe rule assures full recovery of profits for the 
corporation”); EISENBERG & COX, supra note 47, at 1013 (discussing the predominance of the 
formula in Smolowe and Gratz in case law). 
83 For further discussion, see section III.A (arguing that the Smolowe court’s statement of the rule 
must be read as limited to cases involving a single statutory six-month trading period because 
otherwise it would be empirically false). 
84 See Gratz Master’s Report, supra note 11. 
85 Id. ¶ 16. 
86 See id.; Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 15, Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1951) 
(No. 147 Docket 21660). 
87 See Gratz Master’s Report, supra note 11, ¶ 16. 
07 - Chin.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/20/2016  12:50 PM 
2016] THE LEARNED HAND UNFORMULA 1543 
 
 
and sales and purchases . . . within any period less than six 
months . . . .88 
A detail from Claughton’s accounting is reproduced in Figure 4. 
Figure 4: 
Detail of Claughton’s profit calculation.89 
 
 
Gratz and the master were both content to let Claughton handle the math. 
Gratz stipulated that Claughton’s accounting was correct according to the 
Smolowe formula,90 and the master entered a finding that “the profits made 
by Claughton during the less than six months periods have been shown to 
amount altogether to the sum of [$308,417], under the [Smolowe] rule of 
damages.”91 The district court adopted the master’s report in all respects.92 
Hand affirmed the district court’s judgment in a unanimous decision for 
the Second Circuit.93 Hand began his analysis of Claughton’s liability by 
                                                     
88 See id. Various reports of Claughton’s calculation exhibited small typographical and/or 
rounding discrepancies. Cf. Gratz Master’s Report, supra note 11, ¶ 16 (stating the result of 
Claughton’s calculation as $308,417.50 and as $308,417.09); Def.’s Exhibits C & N to Gratz 
Master’s Report, supra note 11 (showing Claughton’s calculation of profits totaling $308,417.05). 
These errors are negligible, and fractional dollars have been omitted hereinafter where warranted for 
clarity of exposition. 
89 Def.’s Exhibit N to Gratz Master’s Report, supra note 11, at 1. 
90 See Gratz Master’s Report, supra note 11, ¶ 16. 
91 See id. 
92 Order ¶ 2, Gratz v. Claughton (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (No. 35-410). 
93 Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 52 (2d Cir. 1951). 
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observing that section 16(b)’s expansive language provided “no principle by 
which to select any two transactions which are to be matched,” thereby 
forcing a choice between matching trades  
in such a way as to reduce profits to their lowest possible amount, or 
in such a way as to increase them to the greatest possible amount. 
The master adopted the second course, following what he supposed 
to be the doctrine of Smolowe. . . . We think that he was right for the 
following reasons.94 
Hand reasoned that any uncertainty in the liability calculation must be 
resolved against the fiduciary, Claughton, in accordance with the traditional 
common law doctrine of spoliation: 
As we have said, the statute makes all such dealings unlawful, and 
makes the fiduciary accountable to the corporation. Although it is 
impossible in the case at bar to compute the defendant’s profits, 
except that they must fall between two limits—the minimum and the 
maximum—the cause of this uncertainty is the number of 
transactions within six months: that is, the number of defendant’s 
derelictions. The situation falls within the doctrine which has been 
law since the days of the “Chimney Sweeper’s Jewel Case,” that 
when damages are at some unascertainable amount below an upper 
limit and when the uncertainty arises from the defendant’s wrong, 
the upper limit will be taken as the proper amount.95 
After rejecting Claughton’s alternative calculation method as falling short 
of this “upper limit,”96 Hand observed that the plaintiff was free to recover 
this maximum amount by matching purchases and sales of equal numbers of 
shares in any way that would produce a short-swing profit: 
If one is seeking an equation of purchase and sale, one may take any 
sale as the minuend and look back for six months for a purchase at 
less price to match against it. On the other hand, if one is looking for 
an equation of sale and purchase, one may take the same sale and 
look forward for six months for any purchase at a lower price. 
Although obviously no transaction can figure in more than one 
                                                     
94 Id. at 51. 
95 Id. at 51–52 (emphasis added); but see John E. Munter, Section 16(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934: An Alternative to “Burning Down the Barn in Order to Kill the Rats,” 52 
CORNELL L. REV. 69, 83 n.64 (1966) (“The validity of the analogy is dubious in cases where the 
defendant would be able to prove the exact amount of his actual profit if the court gave him a 
chance, for then the damages would no longer be ‘unascertainable.’”). 
96 See Gratz, 187 F.2d at 52 (“This results in looking for six months both before and after any 
sale, and not for three months only, as the defendant insists.”). 
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equation, with that exception we can see no escape from what we 
have just said.97 
Hand’s analysis thus led to precisely two legal conclusions: first, that “the 
proper amount” of section 16(b) liability is given by “the upper limit” of 
short-swing profits attributable to the defendant’s trading, and second, that a 
section 16(b) plaintiff is entitled to recover this maximum amount by 
arbitrarily matching pairs of purchases and sales within six months of each 
other.98 
Hand’s opinion offered no view as to whether specifically matching pairs 
of trades according to the “lowest-in, highest-out” formula would yield the 
maximum amount of profits recoverable from Gratz’s twenty-one-month 
trading sequence.99 Hand also expressly declined to review Claughton’s 
calculation and affirmed the sufficiency of the judgment below solely on the 
grounds that the plaintiff had stipulated to it: 
[T]he plaintiff has not appealed, so that she is not entitled to any 
more than she has recovered. On this account we have not examined 
the master’s computations in detail and are not to be understood to 
have passed upon them.100 
Hand’s analysis concluded: “[t]herefore, not only will we follow Smolowe 
v. Delendo Corporation, supra, as a precedent; but as res integra and after 
independent analysis we reassert its doctrine.”101  
It is notable that in undertaking his “independent analysis” of what he took 
to be Smolowe’s doctrine, Hand saw no need to discuss or even mention the 
“lowest-in, highest-out” formula.102 Hand instead focused on and reasserted 
two other doctrinal aspects of the Smolowe decision: the strict character of 
fiduciary liability103 and the determination that section 16(b)’s expansive 
                                                     
97 Id. (emphasis added). 
98 See supra text accompanying notes 96–97. 
99 As it turns out, the Smolowe formula would not have maximized Claughton’s liability. See infra 
app. A, tbls. 1 & 2.  
100 Gratz, 187 F.2d at 52. 
101 Id.  
102 For more discussion of Hand’s view of his Second Circuit colleague Clark’s jurisprudence, 
see, for example, MARVIN SCHICK, LEARNED HAND’S COURT 304 (1970) (quoting Letter from 
Learned Hand to Charles Edward Clark (Feb. 23, 1950)) (“Of course, we have positive differences; 
we should not be worth our salt if we did not . . . . Between ourselves we may say, what I think we 
all believe in secret, that we have a fine court and that each of us contributes to it a part which would 
make the sum much poorer if it were absent.”). 
103 See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir. 1943) (“We must suppose that the 
statute was intended to be thorough-going, to squeeze all possible profits out of stock transactions, 
and thus to establish a standard so high as to prevent any conflict between the selfish interest of a 
fiduciary officer, director, or stockholder and the faithful performance of his duty.”). 
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language warranted “an arbitrary matching to achieve the showing of a 
maximum profit.”104  
In the final analysis, the Second Circuit’s contrasting adjudications of 
short-swing liability in Smolowe and Gratz are easily harmonized. It suffices 
to observe that the historically dominant interpretation of Gratz as an 
authority in support of the Smolowe formula is incorrect. Contrary to popular 
belief, the formula was not among the doctrines from Smolowe that Hand 
“independently examined and adhered to in Gratz.”105 Gratz may have 
followed Smolowe as a precedent with respect to its other doctrines, but 
Hand’s analysis and conclusions provided no support for the Smolowe 
formula. 
B. The Judgment Below and Hand’s Silence in Gratz 
It should be clear at this point that Hand’s decision to “follow 
Smolowe . . . as a precedent” and to “reassert its doctrine”106 did not 
involve an endorsement of the Smolowe formula. Even so, it might be 
possible to interpret Hand’s affirmance of the judgment below as 
encompassing the master’s characterization of the Smolowe formula as 
“[t]he only rule whereby all profits can be ‘squeezed out’ of the 10% 
stock trader [Claughton].”107 
Such a reading, however, would belie Gratz’s historical context. In 
reviewing an accounting of more than 400 transactions over a twenty-
one month period108 in an era when spreadsheets were calculated by 
hand109 and transcribed on a typewriter,110 Hand could not have 
confidently based his affirmance of the district court’s $308,417 
judgment on the proposition that this sum actually represented the 
                                                     
104 Id. at 237. 
105 Kornfeld v. Eaton, 217 F. Supp. 671, 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (“[The Smolowe court] reached an 
empirical judgment that ‘[t]he only rule whereby all possible profits can be surely recovered is that 
of lowest price in, highest price out—within six months . . . .’ This doctrine was independently 
examined and adhered to in Gratz . . . .”); cf. ROMEO & DYE, supra note 16, § 11.02, at 11-8 (“The 
‘lowest-in, highest-out’ method was reasserted, with independent analysis, by the Second Circuit in 
Gratz v. Claughton eight years after its adoption.”). 
106 Gratz, 187 F.2d at 52. 
107 See Gratz Master’s Report, supra note 11, ¶ 16. For such an interpretation, see Duggan, supra 
note 52, § 4 (“In Gratz . . . the court affirmed the adoption of the lowest in-highest out rule for 
computing short-swing profits when there are multiple purchases and sales . . . .”). 
108 See Gratz Master’s Report, supra note 11. 
109 No pun intended. See supra Figure 4. 
110 See Def.’s Exhibits C & N to Gratz Master’s Report, supra note 11 (providing handwritten and 
typewritten versions of Claughton’s liability calculations). 
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maximum possible profit that could be “squeezed out” of Claughton’s 
transactions.111 
Finding a profit-maximizing matching of purchases and sales is an 
example of what Lon Fuller called a “polycentric task,”112 a problem 
whose complexity stems from the fact that each decision point “is a 
distinct center for distributing tensions.”113 Six years after Gratz, in what 
would become his classic article, The Forms and Limits of 
Adjudication,114 Fuller illustrated this concept with the example of a 
probate court’s division of an art collection into two equal shares where: 
[T]he disposition of any single painting has implications for the 
proper disposition of every other painting. If it gets the Renoir, 
the Gallery may be less eager for the Cezanne but all the more 
eager for the Bellows, etc. . . . . Any judge assigned to hear such 
an argument would be tempted to assume the role of mediator or 
to adopt the classical solution: Let the [Metropolitan] divide the 
estate into what he regards as equal shares, let the [Gallery] take 
his pick.115 
Section 16(b) liability calculation is similarly polycentric, in that any 
matching of a purchase 1P  with a sale 1S  may affect the profits 
recoverable from sales that otherwise might have been matched with 1P  
and purchases that otherwise might have been matched with 1S . 
Prefiguring Fuller’s probate judge and his “cut and choose” solution, 
Hand adopted a form of adjudication—giving Gratz the entitlement to 
choose an arbitrary matching of short-swing trades116—that elegantly 
elided the limits of the court’s computational powers.117 It might aptly be 
dubbed “the Learned Hand unformula.”118 
                                                     
111 An accurate computational method for calculating the maximum short-swing profit attributable 
to a sequence of transactions was first published in 1997. See Chin, supra note 38. 
112 See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394 (1978). 
113 See id. at 395. 
114 See id. at 353 (explaining that the initial version of the article was circulated at Harvard Law 
School in 1957). As of Nov. 22, 2016, the query “Fuller /p ‘The Forms and Limits of Adjudication’” 
yielded 1,023 hits in Westlaw’s secondary sources database. 
115 See id. at 394. 
116 See Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 52 (2d Cir. 1951). 
117 This form-of-adjudication approach to the resolution of polycentric disputes has continued to 
inspire a burgeoning game theory literature on mechanism design. See, e.g., STEVEN J. BRAMS & 
ALAN D. TAYLOR, FAIR DIVISION: FROM CAKE CUTTING TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1996) 
(surveying applications of mechanism design to dispute resolution); Steven J. Brams & Joshua R. 
Mitts, Law and Mechanism Design: Procedures to Induce Honest Bargaining, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 729, 773–89 (2013) (applying mechanism design to improve blockholder disclosure 
under section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Lee Ann Fennell, Revealing Options, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 1399 (2005) (surveying applications of option mechanisms to dispute resolution 
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Hand understood that Gratz’s stipulation to Claughton’s calculation 
made it unnecessary to verify its correctness and maximality.119 The 
district court’s $308,417 judgment could be affirmed solely on the 
grounds that Gratz was entitled to an arbitrary matching of purchases 
and sales within six months of each other,120 and Gratz had exercised 
this entitlement by assenting to the matching set forth in Claughton’s 
accounting.121 Hand therefore had no reason in Gratz to rely on or 
endorse the master’s adoption of the Smolowe formula, even implicitly. 
Given Gratz’s historical context and Hand’s famous adherence to 
judicial restraint,122 there is no basis for reading into Hand’s opinion an 
endorsement of the master’s characterization and adoption of the 
Smolowe formula. 
C. Gratz’s Unsuitability for Endorsing the Smolowe Formula 
Hand did explicitly endorse a different aspect of the master’s analysis: 
namely, its adherence to Smolowe’s doctrine of strict fiduciary 
liability.123 Hand also specifically found that the master was right to 
“adopt[] the . . . course” of matching trades “in such a way as to increase 
[profits] to the greatest possible amount, . . . following what he supposed 
to be the doctrine of Smolowe.”124 Hand’s independent analysis of the 
Smolowe doctrine confirmed his conclusion that “the proper amount” of 
section 16(b) liability is given by “the upper limit.”125 
It can now be seen that the calculation of Claughton’s liability was 
unsuitable as a vehicle for endorsing the Smolowe formula, because 
                                                                                                                      
and regulation); Eric L. Talley, Note, Contract Renegotiation, Mechanism Design, and the 
Liquidated Damages Rule, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1195 (1994) (using mechanism design to suggest more 
efficient contract renegotiation procedures). 
118 Cf. supra note 56 (describing the Learned Hand formula). 
119 See Gratz, 187 F.2d at 52. 
120 See id. 
121 See id. 
122 See GUNTHER, supra note 46, at xi (foreword by Ruth Bader Ginsburg) (citation omitted) 
(describing Hand’s approach to judging as “heedful of limitations stemming from the judge’s own 
competence”); Zachary Baron Shemtob, Following Thayer: The Many Faces of Judicial Restraint, 
21 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 61, 71 (2011) (“Few jurists followed judicial restraint as closely as Hand.”); 
Justin Zaremby, Learned Hand’s Two Concepts of (Judicial) Liberty, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 787, 790 
(2013) (“Hand maintains a reputation as a judge whose jurisprudence epitomizes restraint.”). 
123 See Gratz Master’s Report, supra note 11, ¶ 14 (citation omitted) (finding that section 16(b) 
“was intended ‘to be thorough-going, to squeeze all possible profits out of stock transactions . . . and 
thus to establish a standard so high as to prevent any conflict between the selfish interest of a 
fiduciary officer, director or stockholder, and the faithful performance of his duty’”). 
124 See Gratz, 187 F.2d at 51. 
125 See id. at 51–52. 
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Hand could not have endorsed the formula’s use without destabilizing 
Smolowe’s strict fiduciary liability doctrine. It suffices to compare a 
correct calculation of Claughton’s liability using the Smolowe formula 
with a linear programming method that actually “squeeze[s] all possible 
profits out of” a sequence of transactions.126 Using modern 
                                                     
126 The latter method derives from a 1997 article in which I identified the section 16(b) liability 
calculation problem as a special case of the transportation problem in the field of management 
science. See Chin, supra note 38, at 593–99. The transportation problem is, in turn, a special case of 
the linear programming problem. See Alexander Schrijver, On the History of Combinatorial 
Optimization, in HANDBOOKS IN OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCE: DISCRETE 
OPTIMIZATION 13 (K. Aardal et al. eds. 2005), http://homepages.cwi.nl/~lex/files/histco.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/97B7-W6FE]. Any trading sequence can therefore be translated into a linear 
programming problem whose solution represents “the upper limit” of section 16(b) liability. 
For example, consider the following sequence of trades: 
Date Transaction Shares Amount ($) Price ($)/Share  
Jan. 1 Purchase 1,000 $ 9 $ 9,000 
Feb. 15 Sale 400 8 3,200 
Mar. 1 Purchase 2,000 8 16,000 
May 1 Purchase 800 7 5,600 
June 15 Sale 1,200 10 12,000 
Sept. 1 Purchase 1,000 6 6,000 
Oct. 15 Sale 2,400 9 21,600 
For i=1,2,3,4 and j=1,2,3, let pij denote the per-share profit recoverable under section 16(b) from 
pairing the i-th purchase and j-th sale in this table (counting chronologically). For example, pairing 
the shares purchased on May 1 for $7/share (i.e., the third purchase) with the shares sold on 
February 15 for $8/share (i.e., the first sale) yields a recoverable profit of $1/share; this fact may be 
expressed as p31=1. On the other hand, the first purchase on January 1 and third sale on October 15 
are more than six months apart, so p13=0. Thus we form the vector 
P=(p11,p12,p13,p21,p22,p23,p31,p32,p33,p41,p42,p43)=(0,1,0,0,2,0,1,3,2,0,4,3). 
To maximize the total recoverable profit, one must find the number of shares xij for each pair of  
purchases and sales for which the total recoverable profit ∑
ji
ijij xp
,
 is maximum, 
subject to the constraints:  
0:,000,1
400,2800
200,1000,2
400000,1
4
33
22
11
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∑
∑∑
∑∑
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ij
j
j
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i
j
j
i
i
j
j
i
i
j
j
xjix
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This linear programming problem may be solved by standard techniques, such as the simplex 
method. See MOKHTAR S. BAZARAA ET AL., LINEAR PROGRAMMING AND NETWORK FLOWS 91–150 
(4th ed. 2010). The solution vector is: 
X=( x11,x12,x13,x21,x22,x23,x31,x32,x33,x41,x42,x43)=(0,0,0,0,1200,0,0,0,800,0,0,1000), 
for a maximum recoverable profit P·X of $ 7,000. 
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computational tools to apply the Smolowe formula to the sequence of 
Claughton’s common stock transactions yields a liability of $337,599.127 
By comparison, the linear programming method applied to the same 
sequence of transactions produces a liability of $337,800,128 or $201 
more than the result from the Smolowe formula.  
While this is a small difference, it does demonstrate that Hand could 
not have endorsed the formula’s use while adhering to “the upper limit” 
of section 16(b) liability.129 Even if the discrepancy might have gone 
unrecognized,130 Hand’s opinion would have carried within it a latent 
irreconcilable tension.131 Allowing the Smolowe formula to trump the 
plaintiff’s entitlement to “an arbitrary matching to achieve the showing 
of a maximum profit”132 in Gratz would have opened the door to much 
larger discrepancies in other cases. The formula may fall short of the 
maximum by up to fifty percent when trades span a period of more than 
six months, as section III.B will show.133 
The $337,599 result from the Smolowe formula deviates even further 
from Claughton’s accounting, which showed a total liability of only 
$283,835 from common stock trades.134 This latter discrepancy casts 
doubt on the master’s finding that Claughton used the formula in his 
                                                                                                                      
While linear programming problems had been formulated by 1939, see L.V. Kantorovich, 
Mathematical Methods of Organizing and Planning Production (1939), cited in SAUL I. GASS & 
ARJANG A. ASSAD, AN ANNOTATED TIMELINE OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH: AN INFORMAL HISTORY 
50 (2005), and the simplex method was known in 1947, see George B. Dantzig, Maximization of a 
Linear Function of Variables Subject to Linear Inequalities, in ACTIVITY ANALYSIS OF 
PRODUCTION AND ALLOCATION 19–32 (Tjalling C. Koopmans ed. 1951), the application of linear 
programming to section 16(b) liability was not publicly available until fifty years later. See Chin, 
supra note 38, at 596–99. 
127 See infra app. A, tbl. 1. 
128 See infra app. A, tbl. 2. 
129 It also falsifies the master’s characterization of the formula as “[t]he only rule whereby all 
profits can be ‘squeezed out’ of [Claughton] . . . .” See Gratz Master’s Report, supra note 11, ¶ 16. 
130 See, e.g., Kornfeld v. Eaton, 217 F. Supp. 671, 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (describing Gratz’s 
liability calculation as adhering to both the Smolowe formula and Smolowe’s strict fiduciary liability 
doctrine). 
131 Cf. Stuart Benjamin, Stepping Into the Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing Facts and the 
Appellate Process, 78 TEX. L. REV. 269, 281 (1999) (“If the facts on which the opinion relied no 
longer describe the world, then the opinion purports to lay down the current status of the law but in 
fact misdescribes the world, and thus creates an intolerable tension.”). 
132 Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 237 (2d. Cir. 1943). 
133 See supra text accompanying note 38. 
134 See Def.’s Exhibit C to Gratz Master’s Report, supra note 11 (showing recoverable profit of 
$282,572.91 from matching of purchases and sales prior to April 4, 1946, and $1,261.43 from 
matching of purchases and sales after April 4, 1946). Claughton also submitted an accounting 
showing $24,582.71 from preferred stock trades for a total liability of $308,417. See Def.’s Exhibit 
N to Gratz Master’s Report, supra note 11. 
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liability calculations and strongly suggests that Gratz and the railroad left 
at least $53,764 on the table by not challenging that finding. 
When considered together, these discrepancies reveal a deep 
incongruity in the notion that Hand used Gratz as a vehicle to endorse 
the Smolowe formula, even beyond the demonstrated absence of 
evidence that he had any reason to do so.135 It must be remembered that 
Judge Clark provided no mathematical justification for his assertion in 
Smolowe that the formula was “[t]he only rule whereby all possible 
profits can be surely recovered”;136 it was, in the words of another court, 
merely an “empirical judgment.”137 As a factual predicate for Hand’s 
adjudication of Gratz, Claughton’s accounting was so inaccurate that it 
probably did not result from the Smolowe formula’s use, and even a 
corrected accounting would have fallen $201 short of corroborating 
Clark’s empirical assertion. The dominant reading of Gratz as an 
authority for the Smolowe formula’s applicability thus proves to be both 
doctrinally and mathematically unjustifiable. 
III. THE WISDOM OF HAND’S MATHEMATICAL SILENCE 
A.  The Smolowe Formula Needs No Corroboration in Simple Cases 
Until now, through case law, casebooks, and commentary,138 the 
dominant reading of Gratz has played a significant role in ensuring that 
the Smolowe formula has become “firmly ingrained in the fabric of 
Section 16(b).”139 This role has largely been necessitated by the tenuous 
justification for the formula provided by the Smolowe case itself. By 
offering the formula as an “empirical judgment”140 with no mathematical 
rationale, Judge Clark put the formula on a path to be corroborated over 
time through the common law process, rather than proved once and for 
all as a mathematical proposition. In the dominant reading of section 
16(b) case law, Gratz has served long and well as Smolowe’s vital 
buttress, putatively carrying the gravitas of Learned Hand’s independent 
                                                     
135 See supra sections II.A and II.B. 
136 Smolowe, 136 F.2d at 239. 
137 Kornfeld v. Eaton, 217 F. Supp. 671, 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (citing Smolowe, 136 F.2d at 239). 
138 See supra section I.C. 
139 See ROMEO & DYE, supra note 16. 
140 Kornfeld, 217 F. Supp. at 674. 
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analysis141 and extending the formula’s applicability beyond six-month 
trading sequences.142 
The findings in Part I have called into question Gratz’s role as an 
auxiliary authority for the Smolowe formula’s use. As it turns out, 
however, the Smolowe formula no longer has any need of such empirical 
corroboration. The formula states a mathematical fact, not merely an 
empirical judgment, as long as Smolowe’s “within six months” provision 
is correctly interpreted as a limit on the formula’s range of application.143 
What follows is the first known proof that the “lowest-in, highest-out” 
formula correctly produces the maximum profit attributable to a 
sequence of transactions falling within a single statutory six-month 
period. This provides the Smolowe formula with the mathematical 
justification it has lacked for more than seventy years. 
The proof follows a standard technique for software verification 
known as a loop invariant. Loop invariant methods for software 
verification have been formally shown to be sound,144 and various 
introductory texts provide clear explanations and illustrative examples of 
loop invariant proofs.145 For present purposes, it suffices to explain that 
“[a] loop invariant expresses important relationships among the variables 
that must be true at the start of every iteration and when the loop 
terminates.”146 As illustrated in Figure 5, a correctness proof must 
show,147 given that the input satisfies the specified precondition, that: the 
loop invariant (a) is true before executing the loop for the first time148 
and (b) remains true after each iteration.149 In addition, the proof must 
show that (c) the loop’s exit condition is eventually met,150 and that (d) 
                                                     
141 See id. (stating that the Smolowe formula was “independently examined and adhered to in 
Gratz”). 
142 See, e.g., Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 847–48 (2d Cir. 1959) (spanning more than seven 
months); Donoghue v. Casual Male Retail Group, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 2d 226, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(spanning more than ten months).  
143 See supra text accompanying notes 78–80. 
144 See KRZYSZTOF R. APT & ERNST-RÜDIGER OLDEROG, VERIFICATION OF SEQUENTIAL AND 
CONCURRENT PROGRAMS 57–66 (David Gries & Fred B. Schneider eds., 2d ed. 1997). 
145 See, e.g., JEFF EDMONDS, HOW TO THINK ABOUT ALGORITHMS 12–26 (2008) (explaining loop 
invariant proofs and providing examples); DERRICK G. KOURIE & BRUCE W. WATSON, THE 
CORRECTNESS-BY-CONSTRUCTION APPROACH TO PROGRAMMING 55–93 (2012) (providing 
examples). 
146 EDMONDS, supra note 145, at 8 (emphasis omitted). 
147 See id. at 20. 
148 See id. at 17–18. 
149 See id. at 16–17. 
150 See id. at 19. 
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the required result, or postcondition, is achieved when this occurs and 
the loop is exited.151 
Figure 5: 
Structure of a correctness proof that uses a loop invariant (LI). 
Given that input F satisfies the precondition @pre, it is necessary to 
prove that (a) the loop invariant LI is true initially; (b) LI remains 
true after each iteration of the algorithm steps S; (c) the predicate P 
is eventually false; and (d) when P is false, the postcondition @post 
is true.152 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
To formalize the result, it is necessary first to provide the following 
mathematical specification of the “lowest-in, highest-out” algorithm, 
heavily commented to facilitate comparison with less formal descriptions 
of the Smolowe formula in the legal literature. 
1. Lowest-In, Highest-Out 
Precondition: Purchases ( ) ( ) ( )mm qpqpqp ,,,,, 2211 2  and sales 
( ) ( ) ( )nn QPQPQP ,,,,, 2211 2  (listed in nondecreasing and nonincreasing 
                                                     
151 See id. 
152 This diagram was taken from the course blog for CS207: Systems Development for 
Computational Science at Harvard University’s School of Engineering and Applied Sciences. See 
Cris Cecka & Ray Jones, CS207 Systems Development for Computational Science: Loop Invariants, 
HARVARD SCH. ENG’G AND APPLIED SCIS. (Oct. 5, 2014), http://iacs-courses.seas.harvard. 
edu/courses/cs207/blog/index.php [https://perma.cc/XC2D-CJR5]. 
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order of per-share prices, respectively;153 i.e., mppp ≤≤≤ 221 , 
nPPP ≥≥≥ 221 , jiQq ji , allfor  0, > ), all of which occurred within 
the same period of less than six months and within the statute of 
limitations under section 16(b). 
Comment: Recoverable profit M is accumulated by iteratively 
matching blocks of previously unmatched shares (
00
, ji Uu ) at the lowest 
remaining purchase price and the highest remaining sale price until no 
further shares can be profitably matched. 
Postcondition: M is the maximum possible profit that can be attained 
from any matching of the given purchases and sales. That is, for all 
Qq ′′
 ,  with 
  0 ' ii qq ≤≤ , jj QQ ≤≤
'0  for all ji, , such that ∑∑
==
=
n
j
j
m
i
i Qq
1
'
1
' , 
.
1
'
1
' ∑∑
==
−≥
m
i
ii
n
j
jj qpQPM  
{ }11
00
,min,
1,
0,,,
Uuxr
QU
qu
ji
xMSB
←
←
←
←
←

  
 
while ( ) ( )( )0
00
>∧> rpP ij  do 
                                                     
153 In the case where all purchases and sales take place within the same period of less than six 
months, transaction dates are immaterial to matching, and transactions can be listed in any 
convenient order. 
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{ }
{ }
{ }
shares} matched ofnumber   total{update
shares} matchable ofnumber  determine{,min
sale} unmatched price-highest {find0:min
purchase} unmatched price-lowest {find0:min
sold} shares unmatched {update
purchased} shares unmatched {update
profits} {update
sales} from proceeds {update
purchases} ofcost  {update
00
00
00
0
0
0
0
rxx
Uur
Ujj
uii
rUU
ruu
BSM
rPSS
rpBB
ji
j
i
jj
ii
j
i
+←
←
>←
>←
−←
−←
−←
+←
+←
end while 
 
It is now possible to prove the following. 
 
Theorem. Algorithm Lowest-In, Highest-Out terminates with the 
specified postcondition. 
Proof. We use the following loop invariant: 
 

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
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

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=
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==
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=
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)3(
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such that , integers negative-nonexist  there
 ,such that  , valued-real negative-non allFor 
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'
1
'
1
'
1 1
1
1
'
1 1
1
1
1
11
1
1
1
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1
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m
i
ii
n
j
jj
n
j
jj
l
j
l
j
jljj
m
i
ii
k
i
k
i
ikii
l
j
l
j
jj
k
i
k
i
ii
n
j
j
m
i
i
qpQPBSM
QPQxPQPS
qpqxpqpB
QxQqxq
lk
xQqQq

 
In the above loop invariant, the expression )(xBB =  represents the cost 
of purchasing a total of x  shares in nondecreasing order of per-share 
price. Inequality (1) states that there is no lower-cost list of purchases 
q′  totaling x  shares. We present a full proof only for the truth of (1). 
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The proof of (2) is analogous, and (3) follows immediately from (1) and 
(2). 
(a) The loop invariant is initially true: Before the while loop 
{ }( )11,min Uux = , (1) is true because ( ) ∑
=
≤−+≤=
m
i
iiqpqxpqpxpB
1
''
12
'
111  
for any q′  such that xq
m
i
i =∑
=1
' . 
(b) The truth of the loop invariant is maintained: Now suppose (1) 
holds at the beginning of the while loop; thus 10 += ki . There are two 
cases, each of which will imply (1) also holds at the end of the while 
loop. 
Case 1: 
0i
ur = . Then ∑
+
=
=+←
1
1
0
k
i
iinew quxx , and for any q′
 such 
that ,
1
'
new
m
i
i xq =∑
=
we have 
∑
∑∑
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∑
=
+=
+
+
=
+
=
+
+
=
+
=
≤
+=






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Case 2: 
00 ij
uUr <= . Then 
0jnew
Uxx +←  and
∑ ∑
=
+
=
<+=≤
k
i
k
i
inewi qrxxq
1
1
1
. For any q′  such that 
,
1
' rxxq new
m
i
i +==∑
=
 we have 
07 - Chin.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/20/2016  12:50 PM 
2016] THE LEARNED HAND UNFORMULA 1557 
 
 
∑
∑∑
∑∑
∑∑
=
+=
+
=
=
+
=
==
+
≤
+=






−+≤






−++=
m
i
ii
m
ki
ik
k
i
ii
k
i
inewk
k
i
ii
k
i
i
k
i
kii
qp
qpqp
qxpqp
qrxpqpB
1
'
1
'
1
1
'
1
'
1
1
'
11
1
 
 
The proof of (2) similarly breaks into Case 1, where 
0j
Ur = , so that 
∑
+
=
←
1
1
l
j
jnew Qx ; and Case 2, where 00 ji Uur <= , so that 0inew uxx +← . 
Each case in the proof of (2) proceeds analogously to its counterpart case 
in the proof of (1). 
(c) The exit condition is eventually met: the loop terminates when the 
condition ( ) ( )( )0
00
>∧> rpP ij  fails, i.e., when either all remaining 
unmatched purchases were at a higher per-share price than that of all 
remaining unmatched sales, or when there are no remaining unmatched 
purchases or sales. Progress toward termination is guaranteed by the fact 
that during each iteration, Case 1 of the proof of either (1) or (2) applies, 
so that the r  matched shares must exhaust the remaining unmatched 
shares of at least one transaction, i.e., the ( )1+k -st purchase or the 
( )1+l -st sale, respectively. Because there are only nm +  transactions 
to exhaust, the loop must terminate after at most nm +  iterations. 
(d) The postcondition is met upon exit: the postcondition follows from 
(3) and the failure of the exit condition. The postcondition is trivially 
true if all transactions can be matched (eventually 0=r ) or if none can 
be matched ( )11 pP ≤ . We show that the postcondition also holds when 
( )
00 ij
pP >  fails after it has held at least once. 
Let Tx  denote the final total number of matched shares, i.e, the value 
of x  at the beginning of the last iteration of the while loop. Let ( )TT ji ,  
and ( )FF ji ,  denote the respective values of ( )00 , ji  when ( )00 ij pP >  
last holds and fails, respectively; thus 
TT ij
pP >  and 
FF ij
pP ≤ . Also, 
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denote ∑∑
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−=′
m
i
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n
j
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simply states the postcondition in the case Txx =′ . For the case Txx <′ , 
(3) implies 
( )( )
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ijT
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iijj TT
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= =1 1
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and for the case Txx >′ , (3) implies 
( )( )
M
pPxxM
qpQPM
FF ijT
m
i
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n
j
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≤
−−′+≤
−=′ ∑∑
== 1
'
1
'
 
Thus the postcondition holds in all cases. Q.E.D. 
 
This theorem clarifies the Smolowe formula’s mathematically valid 
range—“within six months”—and obviates six decades of unjustified 
reliance on Gratz for empirical corroboration of the formula. 
B. The Smolowe Formula’s Worst-Case Errors in Complex Cases 
The fact that the Smolowe formula is always correct when applied to 
statutory six-month trading sequences does not, of course, imply that it is 
always erroneous when applied to longer sequences.154 The formula’s 
$201 shortfall in Gratz155 does, however, demonstrate its potential for 
material inaccuracy in complex cases.  
The legal community should discontinue the practice of citing Gratz 
to support the Smolowe formula’s use, not only because it is untenable156 
                                                     
154 See supra Figure 2 (illustrating with a hypothetical example). For cases where the Smolowe 
formula correctly calculated the maximum liability attributable to a trading sequence spanning more 
than six months, despite questionable authority for the formula’s use, see, e.g., Adler v. Klawans, 
267 F.2d 840, 847–48 (2d Cir. 1959) (more than seven months); Donoghue v. Casual Male Retail 
Group, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 2d 226, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (more than ten months); Segen v. Westcliff 
Capital Mgmt., LLC, 299 F. Supp. 2d 262, 265–66, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (more than ten months); 
Donoghue v. MIRACOR Diagnostics, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 6696, 2002 WL 233188, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 11, 2002) (more than thirteen months); Morales v. New Valley Corp., 999 F. Supp. 470, 476 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (more than six months); Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 222 F. Supp. 831, 837 (D.N.J. 
1963) (more than nine months), modified, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965); Ark. La. Gas Co. v. W.R. 
Stephens Inv. Co., 141 F. Supp. 841, 847 (W.D. Ark. 1956) (more than thirteen months); Kogan v. 
Schulte, 61 F. Supp. 604, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) (fifteen months). 
155 See supra text accompanying note 128. 
156 See supra section I.C.  
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and superfluous,157 but because it could lead to a significant error in the 
amount of a section 16(b) judgment. While $201 pales in comparison to 
the $53,764 deficiency in Claughton’s calculations,158 it is worth 
considering how much larger the Smolowe formula’s errors might 
become in the worst case.159 
As Jacobs pointed out with his hypothetical examples, the Smolowe 
formula may fall short of calculating the maximum possible short-swing 
profit when some trades are not within the statute of limitations160 and 
when trades span a period of more than six months.161 These two kinds 
of problematic trading sequences give rise to different worst-case 
scenarios, which can be illustrated with the following variations on 
Jacobs’s examples. 
As a worst-case scenario involving trades outside the statute of 
limitations, consider a suit filed in month 28 attacking the following 
trading sequence: 
Month 
Shares 
Purchased 
Purchase Price ($) 
Per Share 
Shares 
Sold 
Sale Price ($) 
Per Share 
1 1,000 1   
2 1,000 1,000   
3   1,000  1,002 
5   1,000  1,001 
The Smolowe formula would pair the purchases in months 1 and 2 
with the sales in months 3 and 5, respectively; however, the statute of 
limitations would bar recovery of profits from the former pair of 
transactions, leaving only the $1,000 proceeds from the latter pair. A 
higher profit of $1,002,000 can be calculated by instead pairing the 
purchases in months 1 and 2 with the sales in months 5 and 3, 
respectively. It should be apparent from this example that the formula’s 
                                                     
157 See supra section III.A. 
158 See supra text accompanying note 134. 
159 Even though the formula’s $202 million short-swing profit calculation in Dreiling v. Jain, 281 
F. Supp. 2d 1234 (W.D. Wash. 2003) was accurate, the court’s citation to Whittaker v. Whittaker 
Corp., 639 F.2d 516, 522, 533 (9th Cir. 1981) as primary authority for the formula’s use was 
unsound. The Whittaker decision features one of the most comprehensive and unqualified 
endorsements of the Smolowe formula in section 16(b) case law, in which it inaccurately states that 
the Gratz court “considered the profit computation issue and, after an independent analysis, 
affirmatively reasserted the Smolowe [formula].” Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516, 522, 
531 (9th Cir. 1981). 
160 See Jacobs, supra note 7, at 533. 
161 See id. at 532–33. 
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error in cases where some trades fall outside the statute of limitations 
may be arbitrarily close to 100 percent. 
A worst-case scenario involving a trading sequence spanning more 
than six months might resemble the following: 
Here, the Smolowe formula would pair the purchase in month 1 with 
the sale in month 5, yielding a recovery of $1,001,000 (leaving the 
transactions in months 2 and 9 unpaired as more than six months apart). 
A higher profit of $2,000,000 can be calculated by instead pairing the 
purchases in months 1 and 9 with the sales in months 2 and 5, 
respectively. It should be apparent from this example that the formula’s 
error in cases covering more than six months may be arbitrarily close to 
fifty percent. 
The following theorem shows that fifty percent is also an upper limit 
on the formula’s error in such cases. 
Theorem 1. For any sequence of trades within the statute of limitations, 
the recovery calculated by the Smolowe formula is at least half as much as 
the recovery calculated by any other method. 
Proof. Assume to the contrary that there exist trading sequences for which 
there is a pairing of trades that results in more than twice the amount of profit 
recovered by the Smolowe formula. Among these trading sequences, 
consider one in which the formula’s pairing involves a minimal number of 
shares (a “Smolowe-minimal” trading sequence). Let )),,(( EYXG =  be the 
bipartite graph corresponding to this Smolowe-minimal trading sequence, 
wherein each vertex Xx∈  represents one share purchased, each vertex 
Yy∈  represents one share sold, and edge Eyx ∈),(  is present with 
weight ),( yxww =  if a pairing of x with y would yield a recoverable 
profit 0>w .162 
                                                     
162 It may be assumed, without loss of generality, that all of the challenged trades involve whole 
numbers of shares; if any fractional shares are involved, all share quantities may be multiplied by 
their lowest common denominator before proceeding with the construction of G without affecting 
the proof. 
Month 
Shares 
Purchased 
Purchase Price ($) 
Per Share 
Shares 
Sold 
Sale Price ($) 
Per Share 
1 1,000 1   
2   1,000 1,001 
5   1,000 1,002 
9 1,000 2   
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Let ))()),(),((( SESYSXS =  be the subgraph of G corresponding 
to the pairing of transactions produced by the Smolowe formula, and let 
)(Sw  denote the total weight of S. By the assumption, there exists a 
subgraph ))()),(),((( TETYTXT =  of G corresponding to a different 
pairing of transactions such that )(2)( SwTw > . 
Let )(),( 11 SEyx ∈  be an edge of maximal weight in S. Then the 
share purchased at 1x  and the share sold at 1y  must be part of the first 
purchase and sale, respectively, paired by the Smolowe formula, and 
),( 11 yx  must also be an edge of maximal weight in G. Let 1G  denote 
the subgraph of G induced by )\,\( 11 yYxX . Because reducing the first 
purchase and sale by one share each leaves the  
“lowest-in, highest-out” sequence intact, it follows that 
)),(\)(),\)(,\)((( 11111 yxSEySYxSXS =  is the subgraph of 1G  
corresponding to the pairing of transactions produced by the Smolowe 
formula, and ),()()( 111 yxwSwSw −= . 
From among the edges in E(T) incident to 1x  and 1y , arbitrarily 
choose representatives ),( 1 yx ′  and ),( 1yx′ . (Without loss of generality, 
these exist and are distinct; otherwise { } 2),(),,( 11 <′′ yxyx   
and the following inequality holds a fortiori.) Then 
)}),(),,{(\)(}),,{\)(},,{\)((( 11111 yxyxTEyyTYxxTXT ′′′′=  is a 
subgraph of 1G  corresponding to a different pairing of transactions such that 
 
( )
),(2
),(2)(2
)in  maximal is ),( (since                     ),(2)(
),(),()()(
1
11
1111
111
Sw
yxwSw
GyxwyxwTw
yxwyxwTwTw
=
−>
−≥
′+′−≥
 
 
but SS <1 , contradicting the assumption that G represents a Smolowe-
minimal trading sequence. Q.E.D. 
C. The Smolowe Formula’s Continuing Fallibility 
Modern technology may have facilitated the accurate calculation163 
and verification164 of short-swing trading liability, but it still has not 
eliminated the risk of error when the Smolowe formula is used 
                                                     
163 See Chin, supra note 38, and accompanying text.  
164 See supra section III.A. 
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improperly.165 In Chechele v. Vicis Capital,166 a shareholder of Bond 
Laboratories, Inc. sued one of the company’s former directors, Elorian 
Landers, over a sequence of 252 purchases and 81 sales of the 
company’s stock between August 2009 and October 2010, a period 
spanning more than thirteen months.167 The complaint alleged that 
Landers had realized short-swing profits of “not less than $30,000” 
calculated using the Smolowe formula.168 The claim settled before trial, 
with the company recovering $30,000.169  
Actual calculations of Landers’s short-swing profits using the 
Smolowe formula and, alternatively, using linear programming methods 
would have yielded $34,967170 and $35,361,171 respectively. 
Interestingly, the Smolowe formula’s small shortfall of $394 in Chechele 
resembles the formula’s small $201 error in Gratz. It also appears that 
Bond Laboratories did not attempt an actual calculation of the 
defendant’s short-swing profits under the Smolowe formula and left a 
significant fraction of the potential recovery on the table, just as Gratz 
did sixty years earlier.172 
Even though Claughton’s handwritten accounting has given way to 
Excel spreadsheets, plaintiffs and their attorneys still might not consider 
careful liability calculations to be worth the effort, because “[r]ecovery 
runs not to the stockholder, but to the corporation.”173 Maximizing the 
                                                     
165 See supra section III.B. 
166 Chechele v. Vicis Capital, LLC, No. 11 Civ. 2191, 2012 WL 310943 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
167 See Complaint ¶¶ 19–20, Chechele v. Vicis Capital, LLC, No. 11 Civ. 2191, 2011 WL 
7566992 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2011) (listing trades). Chechele also sued an investment fund that had 
traded in the company’s stock. See id. ¶¶ 21–25 (stating claim against Vicis Capital Master Fund 
and Vicis Capital, LLC). The claim against the fund was dismissed without prejudice. Chechele, 
2012 WL 310943, at *1. 
168 See Complaint ¶ 29, Chehele, 2011 WL 7566992 (“Under the ‘lowest-in, highest-out’ method 
for computing realized profits pursuant to Section 16(b) of the Act, Defendant Landers realized 
recoverable profits as a result of the transactions described in paragraphs 19–20 above in an 
aggregate amount not less than $30,000.”). 
169 BOND LABORATORIES, INC. ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K) 23 (April 13, 2012), 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1374328/000141588912000538/bnlb10k12312011.htm 
[https://perma.cc/UU4D-DL3U] (noting that $30,000 of Landers’s consulting fees “was setoff 
against amounts owed to the Company as a result of violations of Section 16(b)”). 
170 See infra app. B, tbl. 3. 
171 See infra app. B, tbl. 4. 
172 See supra text accompanying note 134. 
173 Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 239 (2d. Cir. 1943). Out of a $18,894.85 recovery 
in Smolowe, the plaintiffs received about three dollars based on their ownership share, and the 
attorney was awarded $3,000 in fees and $78.98 in expenses. Id. at 241; cf. Louis Kaplow & Steven 
Shavell, Accuracy in the Determination of Liability, 37 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1994) (suggesting a trade-
off between accurate liability calculation and enforcement effort); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 
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short-swing recovery from a sequence of 333 transactions over a 
thirteen-month period is still a polycentric task,174 and the path from the 
Smolowe formula to a matching that actually “squeeze[s] all possible 
profits out of [those] stock transactions”175 is not always direct or 
intuitive. As Figure 6, below, illustrates by reference to Landers’s 
transactions, the facial differences between a profit-maximizing 
matching of trades found by the linear programming method and a 
matching according to the Smolowe formula are complex and subtle. It is 
not readily apparent to a casual observer that the Smolowe formula’s 
matching is deficient, let alone how it can be improved. In light of these 
complexities, the cost-benefit calculus in section 16(b) litigation may not 
yet support the adoption by plaintiffs of a more accurate alternative to 
the Smolowe formula. 
  
                                                                                                                      
Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages, 39 J.L. & ECON. 191 (1996) (arguing that plaintiffs may 
inefficiently overinvest in accurately calculating liability when there are potential gains from doing 
so). 
174 See Fuller, supra note 112, at 394–95. 
175 Smolowe, 136 F.2d at 239. 
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Figure 6: 
Landers’s purchases (down-arrows) and sales (up-arrows) of 
Bond Laboratories stock, matched according to the linear 
programming method (top graph) and the Smolowe formula (bottom 
graph). 
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IV. LEARNING FROM HAND’S MATHEMATICAL SILENCE 
A. An Online Solution 
This Article’s sole normative concern is for mathematical correctness. 
It does not take sides in the longstanding debate over the statute’s 
harshness.176 Nor does it address the merits of Smolowe and Gratz, 
except to urge a more careful reading of their statements and silences. 
Proponents of section 16(b)’s repeal might dismiss the pursuit of 
accurate liability calculation as akin to fine-tuning a sledgehammer,177 
perfecting a trap for the unwary,178 or abetting the creation of a 
                                                     
176 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the Institutional Investor: A Half-Time Report, 15 
CARDOZO L. REV. 837, 895 (1994) (noting that section 16(b) supports the public policy of 
encouraging a “longer time horizon” on the part of corporate managers and investors); Donna Darm, 
Short-Swing Profits in Failed Takeover Bids—The Role of Section 16(b), 59 WASH. L. REV. 895, 
912 (1984) (arguing that section 16(b) punishes unsuccessful takeover bids too harshly); Dessent, 
supra note 52 (arguing that section 16(b)’s strict liability approach is out of step with other legal 
standards developed under Rule 10b-5 to address insider trading, warranting repeal); Jesse M. Fried, 
Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading Through Pretrading Disclosure, 71 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 303, 361–65 (1998) (arguing that section 16(b) should be abolished in favor of pretrading 
disclosure); Kanji Ishizumi, Insider Trading Regulation: An Examination of Section 16(b) and a 
Proposal for Japan, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 449, 484 (1979) (arguing that “[t]he costs of the section 
exceed its benefits”); Marleen A. O’Connor, Toward a More Efficient Deterrence of Insider 
Trading: The Repeal of Section 16(b), 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 309, 323 (1990) (noting that 
commentators began criticizing the statute as soon as it was enacted); Karl Shumpei Okamoto, 
Rereading Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 27 GA. L. REV. 183, 186 (1993) (defending 
section 16(b) under a reconception of the statute as “a device primarily concerned with price 
manipulation by insiders through stock trading”); Ellen Taylor, Teaching an Old Law New Tricks: 
Rethinking Section 16, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1315, 1318 (1997) (arguing that section 16(b) should be 
repealed because it is ineffective, unfair, and expensive); Thel, supra note 44, at 397–99 (conceding 
that “Section 16 is ill-tailored for the task of preventing insiders from taking advantage of inside 
information,” but arguing that it is “an extraordinarily precise measure for getting those in charge of 
publicly held companies to operate them in ways that will benefit the general public”). 
177 See, e.g., O’Connor, supra note 176, at 372–75 (arguing that section 16(b)’s “sledge hammer” 
approach is both overinclusive and underinclusive, and therefore inefficient); cf. Provident Secs. Co. 
v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 787, 792 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (describing section 16(b) as 
“an extremely crude rule of a most deformed and misshapen thumb”), aff’d, 506 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 
1974), aff’d, 423 U.S. 232 (1976). 
178 See, e.g., RICHARD W. JENNINGS & HAROLD MARSH, JR., SECURITIES REGULATION 1402 
(David L. Shapiro et al. eds., 6th ed. 1987) (“Judging solely from the facts stated in the opinions in 
the decided cases, the function of Section 16(b) would appear to be to impose unjust liability upon 
entirely innocent persons.”); O’Connor, supra note 176, at 373 (“Section 16(b) . . . does not provide 
much deterrence because its arbitrary restrictions are easy to evade.”); but see Merritt B. Fox, 
Insider Trading Deterrence Versus Managerial Incentives: A Unified Theory of Section 16(b), 92 
MICH. L. REV. 2088, 2093 (1994) (arguing that insider trading may be deterred by the six-month 
waiting period to make a corresponding trade). 
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monstrosity.179 Defenders of the statute might concede at least some of 
these characterizations, yet take a more appreciative view.180 
One need not take sides on the (probably moot) question of section 
16(b)’s repeal, however, to acknowledge the importance of ensuring that 
“this rule of thumb is no cruder than it needs to be.”181 A matching of 
trades produced by an erroneous application of the Smolowe formula 
does not correspond to any articulable theory of insider trading 
deterrence, does not advance anyone’s ideal approach to securities 
regulation, and does not lend itself to coherent jurisprudence. It is 
problematic for everyone, even proponents of repeal. If sound public 
policy favors faster traffic, the solution is not to use defective radar guns, 
but to raise the speed limit. 
For any federal judges (especially those in the Second Circuit), 
members of the section 16(b) plaintiffs’ bar, and corporate law 
professors willing to consider using and teaching a more accurate 
alternative to the Smolowe formula, a free online tool may now shift the 
cost-benefit calculus in their favor. With the able assistance of 
undergraduate computer science students enrolled in the Fall 2014 and 
Spring 2016 software engineering laboratory courses at the University of 
North Carolina, I have made a “Short-Swing Profit Liability Calculator” 
                                                     
179 See LOUIS LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 1088 n.212 (2d. ed. 1961) (quoting James D. 
Calderwood, Section 16(b): Another Noble Experiment Gone Wrong 32 (address before American 
Society of Corporate Secretaries, Apr. 21, 1960) (“[T]he SEC has gotten so fascinated with the 
algebraic formulae which a fertile mind can conceive under Section 16(b) that it has never walked 
away a hundred paces and taken a good look at the monstrosity which has been created.”). 
180 See, e.g., Thel, supra note 44, at 414–15 (“Automatic forfeiture of short-swing profits eliminates 
the incentive to speculate for the short swing, and thus helps to keep corporate managers from being 
distracted from the business of running publicly held companies.”); Byron D. Woodside, Resumé of 
the Report of the Special Study of Securities Markets and the Commission’s Legislative Proposals, 
19 BUS. LAW. 463, 476 (1964) (“Section 16(b) is about as subtle as a sledge hammer . . . [t]herein, 
in part, lies its virtue. The clamor for certainty is pretty well satisfied in this section of the law.”); 
see also Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 422 (1972) (stating that section 
16(b) is a “relatively arbitrary rule capable of easy administration.”) (quoting Bershad v. 
McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 1970)); Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 515 (2d Cir. 1966) 
(“It might be said that [in enacting section 16(b)] Congress decided in order to throw out the 
bathwater that the baby had to go too.”); Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices Before the Senate 
Committee on Banking & Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6557–58 (1934) (statement of principal 
drafter Thomas G. Corcoran) (“You have to have a general rule. In particular transactions it might 
work a hardship, but those transactions that are a hardship represent the sacrifice to the necessity of 
having a general rule.”). 
181 See Fox, supra note 178, at 2201–02 (reaching no conclusion as to “whether section 16(b) 
should be retained” and stating that “section 16(b) is unlikely to be repealed in the foreseeable 
future” because of popular opposition to insider trading, but concluding “we must be sure that this 
rule of thumb is no cruder than it needs to be”). 
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publicly available on the web.182 If this tool succeeds in making it easy 
to use accurate linear programming methods to calculate short-swing 
profits and to detect the Smolowe formula’s errors when they occur, then 
courts, attorneys, and professors will have less reason to perpetuate the 
misreading of Gratz and the misapplication of the formula. Corporate 
law professors in particular may find the calculator helpful as a reminder 
to students that the formula is not the exclusive method for calculating 
section 16(b) liability. 
In addition to accepting manually inputted transaction data, the 
calculator provides the ability to search the SEC’s public EDGAR 
database for any insider’s Form 4 filings to compile a list of trades 
during any given time period. Figure 7 illustrates how a plaintiff might 
search for trades by Peter Huntsman, CEO of Huntsman Corporation, 
that took place between March and September 2009. 
 
Figure 7: 
The section 16(b) liability calculator’s integrated EDGAR 
database search engine interface. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The search engine retrieves a sequence of four purchases (three of 
which were at a price of zero) and three sales of Huntsman Corporation 
stock. 
 
  
                                                     
182 Andrew Chin, Short-Swing Profit Liability Calculator, UNIV. OF N.C. SCH. OF LAW, 
http://16b.law.unc.edu. 
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Figure 8: 
The section 16(b) liability calculator’s data input interface 
populated by the result of the EDGAR database search depicted in 
Figure 7. 
 
   
 By clicking on the adjacent “Link to filing” links, the user can see 
that the first zero-price purchase was a grant of restricted stock that 
would not vest until March 2, 2010,183 and the other two zero-price 
                                                     
183 The plaintiff in Bennigson v. Huntsman, No. 13 Civ. 452, 2013 WL 5348461 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
24, 2013), apparently concluded that the grant satisfied the requirements for exemption under Rule 
16b-3 and did not refer to it in the complaint. Benningson, 2013 WL 5348461, at *4. The 
requirements for exemption of restricted stock under the rule are quite detailed and beyond the 
scope of this Article. See STANTON P. EIGENBRODT, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SECTION 16: 
REPORTING AND COMPLIANCE, § 11.05[C], at 11-16 (2013). 
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purchases were withdrawals for the benefit of Huntsman Family 
Holdings and not Peter Huntsman. All three of these zero-price 
purchases can be eliminated (using the adjacent “Remove” buttons) as 
not matchable with any of the listed sales. The resulting trading sequence 
is shown in Figure 9 The bottom of the input interface shown in Figure 9 
provides buttons to launch calculations based on the Smolowe formula 
(“lowest-in, highest-out,” or “LIHO”) and linear programming (“LP”) 
methods. 
 
Figure 9: 
The search result depicted in Figure 8 after deletion of exempt 
transactions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This happens to be a case in which the Smolowe formula produced the 
same result as the linear programming method even though the trading 
period spanned (slightly) more than six months. Using either of the two 
methods, the calculator produces the result shown in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10: 
The section 16(b) liability calculator’s output interface providing 
matched trades and recoverable profit from the data in Figure 9. 
 
 The result is reflected in the amended complaint in Bennigson, 
which sought a recovery of $549,030.00.184 
A distinctive feature of the calculator is that it addresses the intricate 
problem of measuring the statutory six-month period in light of the 
complications created by months of differing lengths. According to the 
calendar, the interval that begins on October 30 and ends on April 29 is a 
“period of less than six months,” inasmuch as April 29 precedes the date 
(i.e., April 30) that falls exactly six calendar months after October 30.185 
While a section 16(b) plaintiff could argue for this “matching date” 
interpretation, courts have read the statutory period more narrowly.186 
                                                     
184 See Bennigson, 2013 WL 5348461, at *4. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding 
that the challenged sales were merely “transfer[s] of shares by a Trust of which [the defendant] is 
simply a trustee, to an independent LLC” and therefore not “sales” within the meaning of section 
16(b). See id. 
185 See, e.g., Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 132 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), remanded 
on other grounds, 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1956). 
186 Id. The court adopted a construction of the term “period of less than six months” to require that 
the midnight preceding the start date and the midnight following the end date be less than six 
months apart. See id. at 103. Trades on January 1 and June 29 could therefore be paired for short-
swing profit recovery, but trades on January 1 and June 30 could not. See id. at 103–04. According 
to a leading treatise, the Stella method “has been followed by all courts that have considered the 
question.” ROMEO & DYE, supra note 16, § 10.01, at 10-3. 
In Jammies Int’l, Inc. v. Nowinski, 700 F. Supp. 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), the court considered the 
situation where, due to the varying lengths of months, there was no date six months following and 
numerically corresponding to the first date in a period. Jammies, 700 F. Supp. at 191. The plaintiffs 
argued for “May 1 as the date most closely corresponding to October 31, because it is one day after 
the thirtieth day of the month.” Id. at 192. The court, however, held that in such cases, “the 
corresponding date for the last day of a month is the last day of the month six months hence.” Id. 
The Jammies court also regarded Stella as controlling precedent. See id. Consequently, under 
Jammies, the first permissible trade date in a non-leap year following a transaction on August 29, 
30, or 31 is February 27. The Jammies rule addresses the measurement of short-swing periods that 
begin on March 31, May 31, August 29 (in non-leap years), 30, and 31, October 31, and December 
31. 
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The calculator’s attention to these calendrical details may seem 
arcane, but it simply reflects the level of precision that has emerged from 
six decades of case law on the calculation of section 16(b). This 
illustrates a final point about the cost-benefit calculus of adopting the 
calculator. If the courts have taken such pains to address the 
measurement of short-swing periods that begin on seven exceptional 
calendar dates,187 it seems more than worthwhile for the legal 
community to adopt a freely available alternative calculation method in 
cases where a formula with a worst-case error of fifty percent cannot be 
validly used as a rule for calculating maximum short-swing profit. 
B. Prospects for Change at the SEC 
Rules of law need less and less to rely on computational rules of 
thumb. As Larry Zelenak has pointed out, tax rules are rarely drafted 
with simplicity in mind, now that almost ninety percent of federal 
income tax returns are prepared on computers.188 Zelenak tells the story 
of the “Rule of 78’s,” a simple but inaccurate method of calculating 
interest on short-term installment notes.189 The IRS had historically 
permitted taxpayers to use the rule, but reversed its position in a 1983 
revenue ruling, concluding that it could no longer be used “because it 
fails to reflect the true cost of borrowing.”190 Zelenak notes that the 
Hewlett-Packard 12C, “the world’s first mass-market handheld financial 
calculator,” was introduced in 1982,191 and writes that “it is unlikely that 
the appearance of the ruling shortly after the appearance of the calculator 
was a coincidence.”192  
With the introduction of a free online tool for accurately calculating 
section 16(b) liability, the time is now ripe for the Securities and 
                                                                                                                      
The calculator provides three options for measurement of the statutory “period of less than six 
months”: (1) the calendar method, applying the Jammies plaintiff’s rule for differing lengths of 
months; (2) the Stella method, applying the Jammies plaintiff’s rule; and (3) the Jammies method, 
which incorporates Stella. The Jammies method is selected by default, as it is apparently the only 
reported case on the question of varying lengths of months, but plaintiffs in jurisdictions where 
Stella and Jammies are not controlling may want to consider the calculation of section 16(b) liability 
under other rules. 
187 See Jammies, 700 F. Supp. at 192 (regarding the Jammies rule, which specifies certain 
calendar dates that especially affect the calculation of short-swing profits).   
188 Lawrence Zelenak, Complex Tax Legislation in the TurboTax Era, 1 COLUM. J. TAX. L. 91, 95 
(2010). 
189 See id. 
190 See id. at 96 & n.16. 
191 See id. at 95–96. 
192 See id. at 96. 
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Exchange Commission (“Commission”) to consider updating its 
guidance regarding such calculations. Section 16(b) does not give the 
Commission standing to sue193 and expressly acknowledges the 
Commission’s rulemaking authority194 only with respect to rules and 
regulations exempting transactions from the subsection’s coverage.195 
Nevertheless, there is a strong argument for engaging the Commission in 
the effort to encourage the legal community to adopt more accurate 
short-swing liability calculation methods. 
Importantly, the Commission has used these muscles before.196 It was 
the Commission’s amicus brief in Smolowe that provided the courts with 
the “lowest-in, highest-out” formula that would bear the case’s name.197 
The Commission also filed an amicus brief to the Second Circuit in 
Gratz198 in which it asserted without mathematical justification that the 
Smolowe formula “was the rule for the calculation of profits applied by 
the court below”199 and that “the intention ‘to squeeze all possible profits 
out of stock transactions’ can only be accomplished by the adoption of 
the measure of damages applied in the Smolowe case and in the court 
below.”200 While Hand wisely decided Gratz without endorsing either of 
these dubious assertions,201 the Commission remains on record as an 
                                                     
193 See 15 U.S.C. § 78(p)(b) (2012) (granting standing to “the issuer” and “the owner of any 
security of the issuer”).  
194 Section 23(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 authorizes the Commission “to make 
such rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of this 
chapter for which they are responsible.” 15 U.S.C. § 78(w)(a) (2012). 
195 See 15 U.S.C. § 78(p)(b) (2012) (“This subsection shall not be construed to cover . . . any 
transaction or transactions which the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not 
comprehended within the purpose of this subsection.”).  
196 In the 1991 comprehensive revision to its section 16 rules, see Ownership Reports and Trading 
by Officers, Directors and Principal Security Holders, Release No. 34-28869, 56 Fed. Reg. 7242 
(Feb. 21, 1991), the Commission promulgated Rule 16b-6(c) addressing the calculation of short-
swing profits recoverable from transactions involving derivative securities, see id. at 7272–73 
(promulgating 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-6(c)). See generally Joan MacLeod Heminway, Rock, Paper, 
Scissors: Choosing the Right Vehicle for Federal Corporate Governance Incentives, 10 FORDHAM J. 
CORP. & FIN. L. 225, 288 (2005) (“Substantive competence is, however, acquired through repeated 
relevant rulemaking experience over an extended period of time. The SEC has this experience in 
securities regulation . . . .”); but cf. HARRY MARKOPOLOS, NO ONE WOULD LISTEN: A TRUE 
FINANCIAL THRILLER 63–64 (2010) (arguing that the SEC suffers from an “unbridgeable 
[quantitative] skills gap” in regulating capital markets and must rely on the intervention of 
mathematically sophisticated outsiders). 
197 See SEC Smolowe Brief, supra note 34, at 4–5. 
198 Memorandum for the SEC as Amicus Curiae, Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2nd Cir. 1951). 
199 Id. at 10.  
200 Id. at 11. 
201 See Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 52 (2d Cir. 1951); supra note 134 and accompanying text 
(showing that Claughton probably did not use the Smolowe formula to produce the calculation 
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advocate for the use of the Smolowe formula beyond its intended and 
valid scope. The Commission has subsequently issued two interpretive 
releases describing the application of the Smolowe formula to trading 
sequences spanning multiple six-month short-swing periods,202 again 
without mathematical justification203 and without acknowledging the 
formula’s fallibility when used in this way.204 It does not seem 
unreasonable to request that the Commission now set the record straight. 
A petition for rulemaking may be a productive avenue for eliciting the 
Commission’s interest and support. The Commission has been singled 
out for praise among federal agencies for the transparency and efficiency 
of its petition for rulemaking process.205 The findings in this Article 
could provide the principal basis for a petition for rulemaking or 
interpretive guidance on short-swing liability calculation.206 
It is also possible to seek the Commission’s support by requesting that 
it participate as an amicus curiae in a pending case involving an 
important securities law issue. Given the six decades of case law that 
have incorrectly cited Gratz as an authority in support of the 
                                                                                                                      
adopted by the district court); supra section II.C (showing that the Smolowe formula would not have 
maximized calculation of Claughton’s short-swing profits). 
202 See Commission Guidance on the Application of Certain Provisions of the Securities Act of 
1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rules Thereunder to Trading in Security Futures 
Products, Securities Act Release No. 34-46101, 2002 WL 1677437, at *7 & n.40 (June 21, 2002) 
(stating that under the Smolowe formula, “profit is computed by matching the highest sale price with 
the lowest purchase price within six months, the next highest sale price with the next lowest 
purchase price within six months, and so on, until all shares have been included in the 
computation”); Interpretive Release on Rules Applicable to Insider Reporting and Trading, 
Securities Act Release No. 34-18114, 46 Fed. Reg. 48147, 48161 n.102 (1981) (same). 
203 See ROMEO & DYE, supra note 16, § 10.01[2], at 10-5 (explaining the complexity added by 
multiple short-swing periods). 
204 See supra section III.B (demonstrating the formula’s fallibility and worst-case errors when 
multiple short-swing periods are involved in the Smolowe formula calculation). 
205 As Jason Schwartz and Richard Revesz recently reported to the Administrative Conference of 
the United States: 
After receiving and initially screening petitions, SEC sends the petitioner an acknowledgment 
and transmits the petition to the appropriate division of the agency, as well as to its web staff 
for posting. Stakeholders report this docketing typically happens fairly promptly. The agency 
then continues to update the docket with all comments it receives from the public on the 
petition. SEC reports that even with a relatively high volume of petitions, public comments, 
and other documents to process, its small web team has managed the volume well.  
JASON A. SCHWARTZ & RICHARD L. REVESZ, PETITIONS FOR RULEMAKING: FINAL REPORT TO THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (Nov. 5, 2014), https://www.acus.gov/sites/ 
default/files/documents/Final%2520Petitions%2520for%2520Rulemaking%2520Report%2520%25
5B11-5-14%255D.pdf [https://perma.cc/27WU-FNER]. 
206 Cf. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Just Do It! Specific Rulemaking on Materiality Guidance in 
Insider Trading, 72 LA. L. REV. 999, 1000 (2012) (urging the Commission “to adopt clarifying 
guidance on materiality—one unclear area of insider trading law”). 
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unwarranted and erroneous use of the Smolowe formula,207 the potential 
precedential impact of a case addressing the scope of the Smolowe 
formula’s applicability would likely be substantial enough to warrant the 
Commission’s participation.208 The findings in this Article may prove 
helpful to future parties in making such a request. 
CONCLUSION 
Gratz has finally reached its teachable moment. The takeaway lesson 
is that Gratz should no longer be read as endorsing the Smolowe 
formula, but as wisely declining to prescribe a formula the court was not 
yet technologically competent to validate.209 Given the complexity of the 
modern regulatory state and the pace of recent technological change, the 
Learned Hand unformula’s silent jurisprudential insights might come to 
inform the path of the law in this century as pervasively as the Learned 
Hand formula did in the last. 
                                                     
207 See, e.g., Falco v. Donner Found., 208 F.2d 500, 502 (2d Cir. 1953); Huppe v. Special 
Situations Fund III, 565 F. Supp. 2d 495, 502–03 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
208 See Request for Commission Amicus Participation in a Pending Case, U.S. SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/litigation/briefs/amicusrequest.htm [https://perma. 
cc/AXH6-EVBT] (“In deciding whether to recommend that the Commission file an amicus brief, 
the staff generally considers the following factors: (a) whether the decision in the case is likely to 
have substantial precedential impact; (b) whether the case raises issues important to the 
Commission’s ability to carry out its statutory objectives or other important securities law issues; (c) 
whether there is a potential conflict between the securities laws and other federal or state laws 
involved; and (d) whether the brief might provide an opportunity to convince the court to adopt a 
narrow or moderate holding, rather than a broad and potentially damaging one.”). 
209 Even without Gratz’s endorsement, the Smolowe formula can still validly be applied to trading 
sequences falling “within six months,” as the Smolowe court said. See supra section III.A. 
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APPENDICES 
A. Computation of Short-Swing Profits in Gratz 
Table 1: 
Matching of Edward N. Claughton’s common stock trades210 according 
to the Smolowe formula, as performed by the online Short-Swing Profit 
Liability Calculator.211 
Shares Purchase Date Cost ($) Sale Date Proceeds ($) Profit ($) 
600 12/20/1944 4.22 2/28/1945 8.29 2,444.88 
600 12/20/1944 4.22 2/28/1945 8.16 2,369.88 
200 12/21/1944 4.34 6/19/1945 13.01 1,734.32 
400 12/21/1944 4.34 6/19/1945 12.89 3,418.76 
400 12/21/1944 4.34 6/19/1945 12.76 3,368.88 
600 12/18/1944 4.34 2/28/1945 8.16 2,294.88 
100 12/22/1944 4.47 6/20/1945 16.38 1,191.30 
900 12/22/1944 4.47 6/20/1945 16.34 10,687.41 
1200 12/26/1944 4.47 6/20/1945 16.34 14,249.88 
1000 12/21/1944 4.47 6/19/1945 12.76 8,297.20 
500 12/18/1944 4.47 2/28/1945 8.16 1,849.60 
150 12/26/1944 4.59 6/20/1945 16.34 1,762.49 
850 12/26/1944 4.59 6/20/1945 16.25 9,913.89 
100 12/27/1944 4.59 6/20/1945 16.25 1,166.34 
1000 12/21/1944 4.59 6/19/1945 12.76 8,172.20 
1500 12/19/1944 4.59 2/28/1945 8.16 5,362.05 
600 12/19/1944 4.59 3/1/1945 8.16 2,144.82 
1300 12/19/1944 4.59 2/27/1945 7.91 4,322.11 
1300 12/19/1944 4.59 2/27/1945 7.79 4,159.61 
                                                     
210 See Pl.’s Exhibit 5 to Gratz Master’s Report, supra note 11 (listing Claughton’s common stock 
trades between December 18, 1944 and September 9, 1946 in chronological order). 
211 See Andrew Chin, Short-Swing Profit Liability Calculator, UNIV. OF N.C. SCH. OF LAW, 
http://unclaw.com/chin/16b [https://perma.cc/Q87G-VVK7]; supra section IV.A (describing the 
calculator). All monetary values have been rounded to the nearest cent. See supra note 88. 
Somewhat anachronistically, but without loss of generality, short-swing periods have been measured 
according to two subsequent district court decisions that have clarified the matching of trades 
separated by almost six full months. See generally Jammies Int’l Inc. v. Nowinski, 700 F. Supp. 189 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 132 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), 
remanded on other grounds, 232 F. 2d 299 (2d Cir. 1956). 
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Shares Purchase Date Cost ($) Sale Date Proceeds ($) Profit ($) 
500 12/19/1944 4.59 3/26/1945 7.79 1,599.55 
600 12/19/1944 4.59 4/25/1945 7.68 1,850.94 
500 12/19/1944 4.59 3/27/1945 7.67 1,542.35 
800 12/19/1944 4.59 4/26/1945 7.67 2,467.76 
600 12/19/1944 4.59 3/26/1945 7.67 1,850.22 
1500 12/19/1944 4.59 3/31/1945 6.58 2,983.20 
300 12/22/1944 4.59 6/20/1945 16.25 3,498.72 
1550 12/22/1944 4.72 6/20/1945 16.25 17,884.52 
700 12/22/1944 4.72 6/20/1945 16.25 8,076.81 
200 12/22/1944 4.72 6/20/1945 16.13 2,282.74 
50 12/22/1944 4.72 6/20/1945 16.00 564.45 
350 12/26/1944 4.72 6/20/1945 16.00 3,951.15 
150 12/26/1944 4.72 6/20/1945 15.88 1,674.65 
50 12/27/1944 4.72 6/20/1945 15.88 558.22 
250 12/27/1944 4.72 6/20/1945 15.75 2,759.90 
400 12/21/1944 4.72 6/19/1945 12.76 3,218.88 
2300 12/21/1944 4.72 6/19/1945 12.64 18,221.75 
500 12/21/1944 4.72 6/19/1945 12.51 3,898.90 
100 12/21/1944 4.72 6/19/1945 12.01 729.92 
400 12/19/1944 4.72 3/31/1945 6.58 745.44 
500 12/19/1944 4.72 1/30/1945 6.56 922.30 
800 12/19/1944 4.72 1/29/1945 6.18 1,175.68 
150 12/27/1944 4.84 6/20/1945 15.75 1,637.19 
500 12/27/1944 4.84 6/20/1945 15.51 5,332.65 
500 12/27/1944 4.84 6/20/1945 15.38 5,270.30 
600 12/27/1944 4.84 6/21/1945 15.38 6,324.36 
700 12/21/1944 4.84 6/19/1945 12.01 5,021.94 
400 12/27/1944 4.84 6/19/1945 11.76 2,769.88 
800 12/27/1944 4.84 6/19/1945 10.64 4,642.08 
1000 12/29/1944 5.48 6/26/1945 12.50 7,025.00 
900 12/29/1944 5.73 6/26/1945 12.50 6,097.50 
300 1/23/1945 5.85 7/3/1945 13.64 2,335.50 
100 1/8/1945 5.98 7/3/1945 13.64 766.00 
100 12/29/1944 5.98 6/26/1945 12.50 652.50 
600 1/5/1945 6.11 7/3/1945 13.64 4,515.00 
1000 2/19/1945 7.62 8/9/1945 14.00 6,380.00 
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Shares Purchase Date Cost ($) Sale Date Proceeds ($) Profit ($) 
300 4/26/1945 7.87 10/15/1945 14.76 2,066.16 
100 4/27/1945 7.87 10/15/1945 14.76 688.72 
100 10/4/1946 7.87 9/19/1946 10.39 252.19 
100 10/4/1946 8.00 9/19/1946 10.39 239.69 
400 9/24/1946 8.13 9/19/1946 9.77 655.64 
100 9/24/1946 8.63 9/19/1946 9.77 113.91 
700 9/9/1946 8.88 3/12/1946 14.38 3,852.17 
300 9/9/1946 8.88 3/12/1946 14.26 1,613.52 
100 6/5/1945 9.01 11/20/1945 15.01 600.15 
200 6/5/1945 9.01 11/19/1945 14.88 1,175.38 
300 9/9/1946 9.01 3/12/1946 14.26 1,576.02 
500 6/5/1945 9.14 11/20/1945 14.88 2,870.90 
400 6/5/1945 9.14 11/20/1945 14.76 2,246.88 
400 6/5/1945 9.14 11/19/1945 14.76 2,246.28 
200 6/5/1945 9.14 11/29/1945 14.76 1,123.14 
400 6/5/1945 9.14 9/25/1945 14.63 2,197.00 
200 6/5/1945 9.14 10/10/1945 14.63 1,098.50 
100 6/5/1945 9.14 9/24/1945 14.51 536.78 
800 6/5/1945 9.14 9/25/1945 14.51 4,294.24 
400 6/5/1945 9.14 9/21/1945 14.38 2,097.24 
200 6/5/1945 9.14 9/24/1945 14.38 1,048.62 
100 6/5/1945 9.14 9/25/1945 14.38 524.31 
900 6/5/1945 9.14 9/21/1945 14.38 4,718.16 
100 6/5/1945 9.14 11/2/1945 14.38 524.24 
300 9/8/1946 9.14 3/12/1946 14.26 1,535.52 
400 9/8/1946 9.14 3/13/1946 13.26 1,648.36 
100 9/8/1946 9.14 3/13/1946 13.01 387.16 
900 9/9/1946 9.14 3/13/1946 13.01 3,484.44 
900 9/9/1946 9.14 3/13/1946 12.89 3,372.21 
200 6/18/1945 9.52 12/11/1945 15.01 1,098.02 
800 6/18/1945 9.52 12/11/1945 14.88 4,293.20 
200 6/18/1945 9.52 12/12/1945 14.84 1,064.38 
200 6/18/1945 9.52 12/11/1945 14.76 1,048.14 
600 6/18/1945 9.52 11/2/1945 14.38 2,920.44 
100 6/18/1945 9.64 11/2/1945 14.38 474.24 
300 6/18/1945 9.64 9/21/1945 14.26 1,385.52 
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Shares Purchase Date Cost ($) Sale Date Proceeds ($) Profit ($) 
100 6/18/1945 9.64 10/22/1945 14.26 461.84 
1300 6/18/1945 9.64 10/17/1945 14.26 6,003.27 
400 6/18/1945 9.77 10/17/1945 14.26 1,797.16 
100 6/18/1945 9.77 9/21/1945 14.26 449.28 
200 6/18/1945 9.89 9/21/1945 14.26 873.56 
600 6/19/1945 10.15 9/21/1945 14.26 2,464.68 
200 7/25/1945 11.15 1/14/1946 15.51 870.56 
300 7/25/1945 11.15 1/15/1946 15.26 1,231.02 
200 6/19/1945 11.15 9/21/1945 14.26 621.06 
100 7/25/1945 11.40 1/15/1946 15.26 385.28 
200 7/25/1945 11.40 1/15/1946 15.26 770.40 
100 7/27/1945 11.65 1/15/1946 15.26 360.13 
100 8/22/1945 11.78 1/15/1946 15.26 347.60 
100 8/22/1945 11.78 1/14/1946 15.13 335.21 
200 8/22/1945 11.90 1/14/1946 15.13 645.36 
100 8/22/1945 12.03 1/14/1946 15.13 310.15 
100 8/22/1945 12.03 1/15/1946 15.13 310.15 
200 8/21/1945 12.16 1/15/1946 15.13 595.24 
200 8/21/1945 12.28 1/16/1946 15.13 570.18 
100 8/1/1945 12.41 1/16/1946 15.01 260.10 
100 8/3/1945 12.41 1/16/1946 15.01 260.10 
400 8/9/1945 12.41 1/16/1946 15.01 1,040.40 
200 8/21/1945 12.41 1/16/1946 15.01 520.20 
200 8/21/1945 12.53 1/16/1946 15.01 495.14 
400 8/23/1945 12.53 1/16/1946 15.01 990.28 
200 8/1/1945 12.66 1/14/1946 15.01 470.06 
200 8/21/1945 12.66 1/14/1946 15.01 470.06 
500 8/23/1945 12.66 1/14/1946 15.01 1,175.15 
100 8/1/1945 12.78 1/14/1946 15.01 222.50 
100 8/2/1945 12.78 1/14/1946 15.01 222.50 
600 8/23/1945 12.78 1/14/1946 15.01 1,335.00 
100 8/23/1945 12.78 1/15/1946 15.01 222.50 
400 8/2/1945 12.91 1/15/1946 15.01 839.88 
200 8/9/1945 12.91 1/15/1946 15.01 419.94 
400 8/23/1945 12.91 1/14/1946 14.88 790.00 
200 8/9/1945 13.03 1/14/1946 14.88 369.94 
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Shares Purchase Date Cost ($) Sale Date Proceeds ($) Profit ($) 
100 8/21/1945 13.03 1/14/1946 14.88 184.97 
100 8/21/1945 13.03 1/15/1946 14.88 184.96 
300 7/19/1945 13.16 1/15/1946 14.88 517.29 
300 7/19/1945 13.16 1/16/1946 14.88 517.26 
300 8/9/1945 13.16 1/16/1946 14.88 517.26 
200 8/17/1945 13.16 1/16/1946 14.88 344.84 
1000 2/28/1946 13.16 1/16/1946 14.88 1,724.20 
200 8/17/1945 13.28 1/16/1946 14.88 319.78 
100 8/3/1945 13.41 1/16/1946 14.88 147.36 
200 8/17/1945 13.41 1/16/1946 14.88 294.72 
100 9/5/1945 13.41 1/16/1946 14.88 147.36 
100 8/3/1945 13.53 1/16/1946 14.88 134.83 
200 8/17/1945 13.53 1/16/1946 14.88 269.66 
100 9/5/1945 13.53 1/16/1946 14.88 134.83 
200 8/6/1945 13.66 1/16/1946 14.88 244.58 
200 8/14/1945 13.66 1/16/1946 14.88 244.58 
400 9/5/1945 13.66 1/16/1946 14.88 487.16 
400 8/6/1945 13.78 1/16/1946 14.88 439.04 
200 8/14/1945 13.78 1/16/1946 14.88 219.52 
400 12/12/1945 13.86 1/16/1946 14.88 410.16 
100 7/18/1945 13.91 1/16/1946 14.88 97.23 
900 7/18/1945 13.91 1/14/1946 14.76 763.02 
100 8/6/1945 13.91 1/14/1946 14.76 84.78 
200 8/14/1945 13.91 1/14/1946 14.76 169.56 
300 9/5/1945 13.91 1/14/1946 14.76 254.34 
500 8/7/1945 13.91 1/14/1946 14.76 423.60 
200 7/18/1945 14.03 1/15/1946 14.76 144.50 
200 8/14/1945 14.03 1/15/1946 14.76 144.50 
900 9/5/1945 14.03 1/15/1946 14.76 650.25 
200 7/16/1945 14.03 9/21/1945 14.26 44.62 
1500 7/18/1945 14.16 1/16/1946 14.76 895.80 
200 8/6/1945 14.16 1/16/1946 14.76 119.44 
1000 8/10/1945 14.16 1/16/1946 14.76 597.20 
1100 8/14/1945 14.16 1/16/1946 14.76 656.92 
200 9/5/1945 14.16 1/16/1946 14.76 119.44 
700 9/10/1945 14.16 1/16/1946 14.76 418.04 
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Shares Purchase Date Cost ($) Sale Date Proceeds ($) Profit ($) 
1700 9/11/1945 14.16 1/16/1946 14.76 1,015.24 
900 12/6/1945 14.16 1/16/1946 14.76 537.48 
100 2/25/1946 14.16 1/16/1946 14.76 59.72 
2400 2/27/1946 14.16 1/16/1946 14.76 1,433.28 
200 7/13/1945 14.16 9/21/1945 14.26 19.56 
100 12/7/1945 14.16 1/16/1946 14.76 59.59 
200 9/17/1945 14.29 1/16/1946 14.76 94.38 
200 11/26/1945 14.29 1/16/1946 14.76 94.38 
500 9/17/1945 14.41 1/16/1946 14.76 173.30 
100 9/17/1945 14.41 1/23/1946 14.76 34.66 
850 11/26/1945 14.41 1/23/1946 14.76 294.61 
 
Table 2: 
Matching of Edward N. Claughton’s common stock trades212 according 
to the linear programming method,213 as performed by the online Short-
Swing Profit Liability Calculator.214 
 
Shares Purchase Date Cost ($) Sale Date Proceeds ($) Profit ($) 
100 12/20/1944 4.22 3/27/1945 7.67 345.98 
1,100 12/20/1944 4.22 3/31/1945 6.58 2,600.29 
150 12/21/1944 4.34 6/19/1945 12.64 1,244.63 
350 12/21/1944 4.34 6/19/1945 12.01 2,685.97 
500 12/21/1944 4.34 6/19/1945 10.64 3,151.30 
100 12/18/1944 4.34 2/28/1945 8.29 394.98 
500 12/18/1944 4.34 2/28/1945 8.16 1,912.40 
950 12/26/1944 4.47 6/20/1945 16.34 11,281.16 
700 12/22/1944 4.47 6/20/1945 16.25 8,251.81 
300 12/22/1944 4.47 6/20/1945 16.00 3,461.70 
300 12/21/1944 4.47 6/19/1945 12.76 2,489.16 
250 12/26/1944 4.47 6/19/1945 12.64 2,043.13 
500 12/21/1944 4.47 6/19/1945 12.51 4,023.90 
200 12/21/1944 4.47 6/19/1945 11.76 1,459.94 
500 12/18/1944 4.47 1/29/1945 6.18 859.65 
1,000 12/26/1944 4.59 6/20/1945 16.34 11,749.90 
                                                     
212 See Pl.’s Exhibit 5 to Gratz Master’s Report, supra note 11. 
213 See Schrijver, supra note 126. 
214 See supra section 0. 
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Shares Purchase Date Cost ($) Sale Date Proceeds ($) Profit ($) 
100 12/27/1944 4.59 6/20/1945 16.00 1,141.40 
200 12/21/1944 4.59 6/19/1945 13.01 1,684.32 
200 12/21/1944 4.59 6/19/1945 12.89 1,659.38 
600 12/21/1944 4.59 6/19/1945 12.76 4,903.32 
2,700 12/19/1944 4.59 2/28/1945 8.16 9,651.69 
600 12/19/1944 4.59 3/1/1945 8.16 2,144.82 
1,300 12/19/1944 4.59 2/27/1945 7.91 4,322.11 
1,300 12/19/1944 4.59 2/27/1945 7.79 4,159.61 
500 12/19/1944 4.59 3/26/1945 7.79 1,599.55 
600 12/19/1944 4.59 4/25/1945 7.68 1,850.94 
600 12/19/1944 4.59 3/26/1945 7.67 1,850.22 
800 12/19/1944 4.59 3/31/1945 6.58 1,591.04 
500 12/19/1944 4.59 1/30/1945 6.56 984.90 
300 12/19/1944 4.59 1/29/1945 6.18 478.44 
300 12/22/1944 4.59 6/20/1945 16.25 3,498.72 
300 12/26/1944 4.72 6/20/1945 16.34 3,487.47 
1,850 12/22/1944 4.72 6/20/1945 16.25 21,346.04 
200 12/26/1944 4.72 6/20/1945 16.13 2,282.74 
200 12/22/1944 4.72 6/19/1945 12.89 1,634.38 
1,300 12/21/1944 4.72 6/19/1945 12.76 10,461.36 
1,450 12/21/1944 4.72 6/19/1945 12.64 11,487.63 
450 12/22/1944 4.72 6/19/1945 12.64 3,565.13 
350 12/21/1944 4.72 6/19/1945 12.01 2,554.72 
200 12/21/1944 4.72 6/19/1945 11.76 1,409.94 
300 12/27/1944 4.72 6/19/1945 10.64 1,778.28 
500 12/19/1944 4.72 2/28/1945 8.29 1,787.25 
400 12/19/1944 4.72 3/27/1945 7.67 1,183.80 
800 12/19/1944 4.72 4/26/1945 7.67 2,367.60 
100 12/27/1944 4.84 6/20/1945 16.38 1,153.80 
650 12/27/1944 4.84 6/20/1945 16.25 7,418.71 
200 12/27/1944 4.84 6/20/1945 15.88 2,207.86 
400 12/27/1944 4.84 6/20/1945 15.75 4,365.84 
500 12/27/1944 4.84 6/20/1945 15.51 5,332.65 
500 12/27/1944 4.84 6/20/1945 15.38 5,270.30 
600 12/27/1944 4.84 6/21/1945 15.38 6,324.36 
600 12/21/1944 4.84 6/19/1945 12.76 4,753.32 
100 12/21/1944 4.84 6/19/1945 12.01 717.42 
1,000 12/29/1944 5.48 6/26/1945 12.50 7,025.00 
900 12/29/1944 5.73 6/26/1945 12.50 6,097.50 
300 1/23/1945 5.85 7/3/1945 13.64 2,335.50 
100 1/8/1945 5.98 7/3/1945 13.64 766.00 
100 1/3/1945 5.98 6/26/1945 12.50 652.50 
600 1/23/1945 6.11 7/3/1945 13.64 4,515.00 
1,000 2/19/1945 7.62 8/9/1945 14.00 6,380.00 
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Shares Purchase Date Cost ($) Sale Date Proceeds ($) Profit ($) 
300 4/26/1945 7.87 10/15/1945 14.76 2,066.16 
100 4/27/1945 7.87 9/21/1945 14.38 651.31 
100 10/4/1946 7.87 9/19/1946 9.77 189.91 
100 10/4/1946 8.00 9/19/1946 9.77 177.41 
200 9/24/1946 8.13 9/19/1946 10.39 452.38 
200 9/24/1946 8.13 9/19/1946 9.77 327.82 
100 9/24/1946 8.63 9/19/1946 9.77 113.91 
1,000 9/9/1946 8.88 3/13/1946 13.01 4,131.60 
300 6/5/1945 9.01 9/21/1945 14.38 1,613.43 
300 9/9/1946 9.01 3/12/1946 14.38 1,613.43 
400 6/5/1945 9.14 11/19/1945 14.76 2,246.28 
200 6/5/1945 9.14 11/29/1945 14.76 1,123.14 
800 6/5/1945 9.14 9/25/1945 14.51 4,294.24 
400 9/9/1946 9.14 3/12/1946 14.38 2,097.24 
900 6/5/1945 9.14 9/21/1945 14.38 4,718.16 
800 6/5/1945 9.14 11/2/1945 14.38 4,193.92 
100 6/5/1945 9.14 10/22/1945 14.26 511.84 
900 9/9/1946 9.14 3/12/1946 14.26 4,606.56 
1,500 6/5/1945 9.14 9/21/1945 14.26 7,676.70 
400 9/8/1946 9.14 3/13/1946 13.26 1,648.36 
400 9/8/1946 9.14 3/13/1946 12.89 1,498.76 
500 9/9/1946 9.14 3/13/1946 12.89 1,873.45 
100 6/18/1945 9.52 11/20/1945 15.01 549.15 
200 6/18/1945 9.52 12/11/1945 15.01 1,098.02 
200 6/18/1945 9.52 11/19/1945 14.88 1,073.38 
500 6/18/1945 9.52 11/20/1945 14.88 2,683.40 
400 6/18/1945 9.52 12/11/1945 14.88 2,146.60 
400 6/18/1945 9.52 11/20/1945 14.76 2,096.88 
200 6/18/1945 9.52 12/11/1945 14.76 1,048.14 
100 6/18/1945 9.64 12/12/1945 14.84 519.69 
1,700 6/18/1945 9.64 10/17/1945 14.26 7,850.43 
400 6/18/1945 9.77 12/11/1945 14.88 2,046.60 
100 6/18/1945 9.77 12/12/1945 14.84 507.19 
200 6/18/1945 9.89 10/10/1945 14.63 948.50 
300 6/19/1945 10.15 9/25/1945 14.63 1,344.75 
200 6/19/1945 10.15 9/24/1945 14.38 846.62 
100 6/19/1945 10.15 9/25/1945 14.38 423.31 
500 7/25/1945 11.15 1/16/1946 14.76 1,802.35 
100 6/19/1945 11.15 9/24/1945 14.51 335.53 
100 6/19/1945 11.15 9/21/1945 14.26 310.59 
300 7/25/1945 11.40 1/14/1946 15.01 1,081.05 
100 7/27/1945 11.65 1/14/1946 14.88 322.81 
200 8/22/1945 11.78 1/14/1946 14.76 595.62 
200 8/22/1945 11.90 1/14/1946 15.01 620.44 
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200 8/22/1945 12.03 1/14/1946 15.01 595.38 
200 8/21/1945 12.16 1/16/1946 14.76 520.44 
200 8/21/1945 12.28 1/15/1946 15.13 570.18 
100 8/1/1945 12.41 1/16/1946 14.88 247.61 
100 8/3/1945 12.41 1/14/1946 14.76 235.16 
400 8/9/1945 12.41 1/14/1946 14.76 940.64 
200 8/21/1945 12.41 1/16/1946 14.76 470.32 
200 8/21/1945 12.53 1/16/1946 14.76 445.26 
400 8/23/1945 12.53 1/16/1946 14.76 890.52 
200 8/1/1945 12.66 1/16/1946 14.76 420.18 
200 8/21/1945 12.66 1/15/1946 14.76 420.18 
500 8/23/1945 12.66 1/16/1946 14.76 1,050.45 
100 8/1/1945 12.78 1/15/1946 14.76 197.56 
100 8/2/1945 12.78 1/15/1946 14.76 197.56 
700 8/23/1945 12.78 1/16/1946 14.76 1,382.92 
400 8/2/1945 12.91 1/16/1946 14.76 740.12 
200 8/9/1945 12.91 1/16/1946 14.76 370.06 
400 8/23/1945 12.91 1/16/1946 14.76 740.12 
200 8/9/1945 13.03 1/14/1946 15.01 394.88 
200 8/21/1945 13.03 1/14/1946 15.01 394.88 
1,000 2/28/1946 13.16 1/16/1946 14.88 1,724.20 
600 7/19/1945 13.16 1/16/1946 14.76 959.82 
300 8/9/1945 13.16 1/16/1946 14.76 479.91 
200 8/17/1945 13.16 1/16/1946 14.76 319.94 
200 8/17/1945 13.28 1/14/1946 15.01 344.76 
100 8/3/1945 13.41 1/14/1946 14.88 147.38 
200 8/17/1945 13.41 1/16/1946 14.76 269.82 
100 9/5/1945 13.41 1/15/1946 14.76 134.91 
200 8/17/1945 13.53 1/15/1946 15.26 344.34 
100 8/3/1945 13.53 1/16/1946 14.76 122.38 
100 9/5/1945 13.53 1/14/1946 14.76 122.38 
200 8/6/1945 13.66 1/15/1946 15.26 319.26 
200 8/14/1945 13.66 1/15/1946 14.76 219.68 
400 9/5/1945 13.66 1/16/1946 14.76 437.36 
400 8/6/1945 13.78 1/16/1946 14.76 389.24 
200 8/14/1945 13.78 1/16/1946 14.76 194.62 
400 12/12/1945 13.86 1/16/1946 14.88 410.16 
400 7/18/1945 13.91 1/15/1946 14.88 388.96 
600 7/18/1945 13.91 1/16/1946 14.88 583.38 
100 8/6/1945 13.91 1/16/1946 14.88 97.23 
200 8/14/1945 13.91 1/15/1946 14.76 169.56 
300 9/5/1945 13.91 1/16/1946 14.76 254.34 
500 8/7/1945 13.91 1/14/1946 14.76 423.60 
200 7/16/1945 14.03 1/14/1946 15.51 294.12 
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200 7/18/1945 14.03 1/15/1946 15.26 244.24 
200 9/5/1945 14.03 1/16/1946 15.13 219.30 
200 8/14/1945 14.03 1/15/1946 14.76 144.50 
700 9/5/1945 14.03 1/23/1946 14.76 505.75 
200 8/14/1945 14.16 1/15/1946 15.26 219.18 
100 7/18/1945 14.16 1/15/1946 15.13 97.12 
200 8/6/1945 14.16 1/14/1946 15.13 194.24 
200 7/17/1945 14.16 1/14/1946 15.01 169.32 
1,300 7/18/1945 14.16 1/16/1946 15.01 1,100.58 
700 8/14/1945 14.16 1/15/1946 15.01 592.62 
50 9/5/1945 14.16 1/16/1946 15.01 42.33 
400 7/17/1945 14.16 1/14/1946 14.88 288.76 
100 7/18/1945 14.16 1/14/1946 14.88 72.19 
100 2/25/1946 14.16 1/16/1946 14.88 72.17 
2,400 2/27/1946 14.16 1/16/1946 14.88 1,732.08 
100 7/13/1945 14.16 10/15/1945 14.76 59.72 
1,000 8/10/1945 14.16 1/16/1946 14.76 597.20 
200 8/14/1945 14.16 1/23/1946 14.76 119.44 
100 9/5/1945 14.16 1/15/1946 14.76 59.72 
50 9/5/1945 14.16 1/23/1946 14.76 29.86 
700 9/10/1945 14.16 1/16/1946 14.76 418.04 
1,700 9/11/1945 14.16 1/16/1946 14.76 1,015.24 
900 12/6/1945 14.16 1/16/1946 14.76 537.48 
100 7/13/1945 14.16 9/25/1945 14.63 47.25 
200 7/13/1945 14.16 9/21/1945 14.26 19.68 
100 12/7/1945 14.16 1/14/1946 14.76 59.59 
200 9/17/1945 14.29 1/14/1946 15.13 169.18 
200 11/26/1945 14.29 1/14/1946 15.01 144.26 
50 11/26/1945 14.41 1/16/1946 15.01 29.80 
600 11/26/1945 14.41 1/14/1946 14.76 207.96 
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B. Computation of Short-Swing Profits in Chechele 
Table 3: 
Matching of Elorian Landers’s trades in Bond Laboratories, Inc. 
common stock215 according to the Smolowe formula, as performed by the 
online Short-Swing Profit Liability Calculator.216 
Shares Purchase Date Cost ($) Sale Date Proceeds ($) Profit ($) 
500 10/13/2010 0.20 4/23/2010 0.48 140.00 
1,000 9/27/2010 0.21 4/23/2010 0.48 270.00 
2,500 9/27/2010 0.21 4/23/2010 0.47 650.00 
375 9/27/2010 0.21 4/22/2010 0.45 90.00 
400 10/12/2010 0.21 4/22/2010 0.45 96.00 
150 10/15/2010 0.22 4/22/2010 0.45 34.50 
250 10/12/2010 0.22 4/22/2010 0.45 57.50 
550 10/12/2010 0.22 4/22/2010 0.45 126.50 
675 10/5/2010 0.22 4/22/2010 0.45 155.25 
1,700 10/12/2010 0.22 4/22/2010 0.45 391.00 
600 10/15/2010 0.22 4/21/2010 0.44 132.00 
275 10/5/2010 0.23 4/21/2010 0.44 57.75 
450 10/1/2010 0.23 4/21/2010 0.44 94.50 
500 9/29/2010 0.23 4/21/2010 0.44 105.00 
575 9/22/2010 0.23 4/21/2010 0.44 120.75 
250 10/5/2010 0.23 7/23/2010 0.33 25.00 
1,750 10/5/2010 0.23 7/23/2010 0.33 175.00 
50 10/6/2010 0.23 8/4/2010 0.31 4.00 
450 10/5/2010 0.23 8/4/2010 0.31 36.00 
1,000 10/6/2010 0.23 8/4/2010 0.31 80.00 
50 10/6/2010 0.23 7/30/2010 0.30 3.50 
2,000 10/6/2010 0.23 7/27/2010 0.30 140.00 
460 10/6/2010 0.24 7/30/2010 0.30 27.60 
1,000 7/16/2010 0.25 3/12/2010 0.54 290.00 
500 9/24/2010 0.26 7/30/2010 0.30 20.00 
500 5/28/2010 0.27 12/1/2009 0.85 290.00 
                                                     
215 See Complaint ¶¶ 19–20, Chechele v. Vicis Capital, LLC, 2011 WL 7566992 (S.D.N.Y. filed 
Mar. 30, 2011) (listing purchases between Aug. 17, 2009 and Oct. 15, 2010, and sales between Aug. 
20, 2009 and Oct 5, 2010, respectively, in chronological order). 
216 See supra section IV.A. 
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500 7/21/2010 0.27 3/12/2010 0.54 135.00 
500 7/21/2010 0.27 3/12/2010 0.54 135.00 
500 8/27/2010 0.27 3/12/2010 0.54 135.00 
1,000 7/15/2010 0.27 3/12/2010 0.54 270.00 
990 9/16/2010 0.27 7/30/2010 0.30 29.70 
2,000 9/16/2010 0.27 8/4/2010 0.30 60.00 
500 8/25/2010 0.28 3/12/2010 0.54 130.00 
1,000 7/20/2010 0.28 3/12/2010 0.54 260.00 
1,000 7/16/2010 0.29 2/10/2010 0.52 230.00 
1,000 8/16/2010 0.29 2/23/2010 0.50 210.00 
1,000 8/17/2010 0.29 2/23/2010 0.50 210.00 
1,000 8/17/2009 0.30 9/24/2009 1.51 1,210.00 
1,000 8/19/2009 0.30 9/28/2009 1.48 1,180.00 
1,000 8/17/2009 0.34 9/25/2009 1.45 1,110.00 
1,000 8/17/2009 0.34 9/25/2009 1.43 1,090.00 
1,000 8/17/2009 0.34 9/25/2009 1.40 1,060.00 
1,000 8/17/2009 0.34 9/23/2009 1.35 1,010.00 
1,000 8/17/2009 0.34 9/29/2009 1.35 1,010.00 
500 8/19/2009 0.34 9/23/2009 1.33 495.00 
500 5/13/2010 0.36 12/1/2009 0.85 245.00 
500 5/13/2010 0.36 11/24/2009 0.81 225.00 
1,000 5/18/2010 0.36 11/30/2009 0.81 450.00 
300 5/18/2010 0.36 12/7/2009 0.75 117.00 
150 5/21/2010 0.37 12/8/2009 0.75 57.00 
250 5/21/2010 0.37 12/23/2009 0.75 95.00 
300 5/19/2010 0.37 12/8/2009 0.75 114.00 
550 5/19/2010 0.37 12/8/2009 0.75 209.00 
700 5/19/2010 0.37 12/7/2009 0.75 266.00 
750 6/14/2010 0.37 12/23/2009 0.75 285.00 
750 6/14/2010 0.37 12/22/2009 0.66 217.50 
500 8/17/2009 0.38 9/23/2009 1.33 475.00 
500 8/17/2009 0.38 9/23/2009 1.28 450.00 
500 8/17/2009 0.38 9/23/2009 1.28 450.00 
500 8/17/2009 0.38 10/1/2009 1.25 435.00 
500 8/20/2009 0.38 10/1/2009 1.25 435.00 
500 8/20/2009 0.38 10/5/2009 1.25 435.00 
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400 5/14/2010 0.38 12/11/2009 0.73 140.00 
250 5/14/2010 0.38 12/22/2009 0.66 70.00 
500 8/21/2009 0.39 10/5/2009 1.25 430.00 
1,000 8/21/2009 0.39 9/23/2009 1.24 850.00 
1,000 8/21/2009 0.39 10/6/2009 1.17 780.00 
1,000 8/21/2009 0.39 10/6/2009 1.12 730.00 
500 8/21/2009 0.40 10/6/2009 1.11 355.00 
500 8/21/2009 0.40 10/6/2009 1.11 355.00 
500 2/26/2010 0.40 10/12/2009 1.06 330.00 
500 8/24/2009 0.41 10/12/2009 1.06 325.00 
500 8/24/2009 0.41 10/12/2009 1.03 310.00 
2,000 2/3/2010 0.42 10/12/2009 1.03 1,220.00 
1,000 2/3/2010 0.42 10/13/2009 1.02 600.00 
250 4/13/2010 0.42 10/21/2009 0.99 142.50 
250 4/14/2010 0.42 10/21/2009 0.99 142.50 
1,000 2/3/2010 0.42 9/21/2009 0.99 570.00 
1,000 2/3/2010 0.42 9/22/2009 0.99 570.00 
500 8/24/2009 0.43 10/21/2009 0.99 280.00 
1,000 8/24/2009 0.43 10/12/2009 0.99 560.00 
500 8/24/2009 0.43 9/16/2009 0.96 265.00 
500 8/25/2009 0.43 9/16/2009 0.96 265.00 
250 2/23/2010 0.43 9/18/2009 0.94 127.50 
500 8/25/2009 0.43 9/18/2009 0.94 255.00 
125 2/23/2010 0.43 10/14/2009 0.90 58.75 
300 4/12/2010 0.43 10/14/2009 0.90 141.00 
320 4/15/2010 0.43 10/19/2009 0.88 144.00 
350 4/26/2010 0.43 11/4/2009 0.88 157.50 
575 1/29/2010 0.44 10/14/2009 0.90 264.50 
25 1/29/2010 0.44 9/16/2009 0.89 11.25 
975 2/1/2010 0.44 9/16/2009 0.89 438.75 
25 2/1/2010 0.44 10/9/2009 0.88 11.00 
25 2/18/2010 0.44 10/19/2009 0.88 11.00 
55 4/26/2010 0.44 11/4/2009 0.88 24.20 
250 4/8/2010 0.44 11/4/2009 0.88 110.00 
345 3/4/2010 0.44 11/4/2009 0.88 151.80 
400 2/1/2010 0.44 10/9/2009 0.88 176.00 
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575 2/18/2010 0.44 10/9/2009 0.88 253.00 
655 3/4/2010 0.44 10/19/2009 0.88 288.20 
170 4/26/2010 0.44 11/2/2009 0.85 69.70 
225 4/27/2010 0.44 11/2/2009 0.85 92.25 
370 1/29/2010 0.45 9/15/2009 0.86 151.70 
630 1/29/2010 0.45 9/15/2009 0.86 258.30 
130 1/29/2010 0.45 11/2/2009 0.85 52.00 
410 2/19/2010 0.45 11/2/2009 0.85 164.00 
415 2/3/2010 0.45 11/2/2009 0.85 166.00 
10 2/22/2010 0.45 9/14/2009 0.80 3.50 
400 2/22/2010 0.45 9/14/2009 0.80 140.00 
590 2/19/2010 0.45 9/14/2009 0.80 206.50 
60 4/16/2010 0.45 10/28/2009 0.77 19.20 
440 2/22/2010 0.45 10/28/2009 0.77 140.80 
500 2/25/2010 0.45 10/28/2009 0.77 160.00 
220 4/16/2010 0.45 10/28/2009 0.70 55.00 
250 4/20/2010 0.45 10/28/2009 0.70 62.50 
300 4/20/2010 0.45 10/28/2009 0.70 75.00 
200 4/19/2010 0.46 10/28/2009 0.70 48.00 
225 1/28/2010 0.47 10/16/2009 0.75 63.00 
350 2/12/2010 0.47 10/16/2009 0.75 98.00 
425 3/5/2010 0.47 10/16/2009 0.75 119.00 
575 3/5/2010 0.47 9/10/2009 0.73 149.50 
1,000 3/10/2010 0.47 10/7/2009 0.72 250.00 
205 3/11/2010 0.47 10/28/2009 0.70 47.15 
500 3/11/2010 0.47 10/28/2009 0.70 115.00 
1,000 8/26/2009 0.48 8/27/2009 0.74 260.00 
425 8/26/2009 0.48 9/10/2009 0.73 106.25 
75 2/5/2010 0.48 9/3/2009 0.72 18.00 
325 2/5/2010 0.48 9/4/2009 0.72 78.00 
350 2/2/2010 0.48 9/3/2009 0.72 84.00 
400 2/5/2010 0.48 9/4/2009 0.72 96.00 
575 8/26/2009 0.48 9/3/2009 0.72 138.00 
220 2/3/2010 0.49 9/4/2009 0.72 50.60 
250 3/5/2010 0.49 9/8/2009 0.70 52.50 
1,000 3/5/2010 0.50 9/8/2009 0.70 200.00 
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55 1/25/2010 0.51 9/4/2009 0.72 11.55 
30 2/12/2010 0.51 9/3/2009 0.70 5.70 
245 2/2/2010 0.51 9/3/2009 0.70 46.55 
280 2/4/2010 0.51 9/3/2009 0.70 53.20 
320 2/12/2010 0.51 9/9/2009 0.70 60.80 
445 1/25/2010 0.51 9/3/2009 0.70 84.55 
180 8/27/2009 0.52 9/9/2009 0.70 32.40 
500 8/27/2009 0.52 9/9/2009 0.70 90.00 
320 8/27/2009 0.52 9/1/2009 0.66 44.80 
680 1/26/2010 0.52 9/1/2009 0.66 95.20 
430 1/27/2010 0.52 9/1/2009 0.64 51.60 
570 1/26/2010 0.52 9/1/2009 0.64 68.40 
20 1/27/2010 0.52 8/27/2009 0.58 1.20 
275 2/23/2010 0.52 8/27/2009 0.58 16.50 
590 2/10/2010 0.53 8/27/2009 0.58 29.50 
600 1/25/2010 0.53 8/27/2009 0.58 30.00 
15 1/22/2010 0.56 8/27/2009 0.58 0.30 
 
Table 4: 
Matching of Elorian Landers’s trades in Bond Laboratories, Inc. 
common stock217 according to the linear programming method,218 as 
performed by the online Short-Swing Profit Liability Calculator.219 
Shares Purchase Date Cost ($) Sale Date Proceeds ($) Profit ($) 
500 10/13/2010 0.20 7/23/2010 0.33 65.00 
375 9/27/2010 0.21 4/21/2010 0.44 86.25 
400 10/12/2010 0.21 7/23/2010 0.33 48.00 
1,500 9/27/2010 0.21 7/30/2010 0.30 135.00 
2,000 9/27/2010 0.21 8/4/2010 0.30 180.00 
875 10/12/2010 0.22 4/23/2010 0.48 227.50 
765 10/12/2010 0.22 4/23/2010 0.47 191.25 
675 10/5/2010 0.22 4/22/2010 0.45 155.25 
                                                     
217 See Chin, supra note 215. 
218 See Schrijver, supra note 126. 
219 See supra section IV.A. 
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610 10/12/2010 0.22 7/23/2010 0.33 67.10 
250 10/12/2010 0.22 7/23/2010 0.33 27.50 
240 10/15/2010 0.22 7/23/2010 0.33 26.40 
510 10/15/2010 0.22 7/27/2010 0.30 40.80 
100 10/1/2010 0.23 4/23/2010 0.48 25.00 
525 10/5/2010 0.23 4/23/2010 0.48 131.25 
1,275 10/6/2010 0.23 4/23/2010 0.47 306.00 
575 9/22/2010 0.23 4/22/2010 0.45 126.50 
500 9/29/2010 0.23 4/22/2010 0.45 110.00 
350 10/1/2010 0.23 4/22/2010 0.45 77.00 
2,000 10/5/2010 0.23 4/22/2010 0.45 440.00 
200 10/5/2010 0.23 4/21/2010 0.44 42.00 
1,000 10/6/2010 0.23 4/21/2010 0.44 210.00 
825 10/6/2010 0.23 4/21/2010 0.44 173.25 
460 10/6/2010 0.24 4/23/2010 0.47 105.80 
1,000 7/16/2010 0.25 2/10/2010 0.52 270.00 
500 9/24/2010 0.26 7/27/2010 0.30 20.00 
500 5/28/2010 0.27 12/8/2009 0.75 240.00 
1,000 7/15/2010 0.27 3/12/2010 0.54 270.00 
500 8/27/2010 0.27 3/12/2010 0.54 135.00 
1,000 7/21/2010 0.27 3/12/2010 0.54 135.00 
1,500 9/16/2010 0.27 8/4/2010 0.31 60.00 
500 9/16/2010 0.27 7/30/2010 0.30 15.00 
990 9/22/2010 0.27 7/27/2010 0.30 29.70 
1,000 7/20/2010 0.28 3/12/2010 0.54 260.00 
1,500 8/25/2010 0.28 3/12/2010 0.54 390.00 
500 8/26/2010 0.28 3/12/2010 0.54 130.00 
500 9/3/2010 0.29 3/12/2010 0.54 125.00 
1,000 8/18/2010 0.29 2/23/2010 0.50 210.00 
500 8/17/2009 0.30 10/12/2009 1.03 365.00 
500 8/17/2009 0.30 9/16/2009 0.89 295.00 
1,000 8/19/2009 0.30 8/27/2009 0.55 250.00 
1,000 8/17/2009 0.34 9/23/2009 1.24 900.00 
2,000 8/17/2009 0.34 10/12/2009 1.03 1,380.00 
1,000 8/17/2009 0.34 9/15/2009 0.86 520.00 
1,000 8/17/2009 0.34 9/14/2009 0.80 460.00 
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500 8/19/2009 0.34 9/8/2009 0.70 180.00 
500 5/13/2010 0.36 12/1/2009 0.85 245.00 
500 5/13/2010 0.36 11/24/2009 0.81 225.00 
300 5/18/2010 0.36 11/30/2009 0.81 135.00 
1,000 5/18/2010 0.36 12/7/2009 0.75 390.00 
500 5/19/2010 0.37 12/1/2009 0.85 240.00 
700 5/19/2010 0.37 11/30/2009 0.81 308.00 
50 5/19/2010 0.37 12/8/2009 0.75 19.00 
250 5/19/2010 0.37 12/23/2009 0.75 95.00 
50 5/19/2010 0.37 12/8/2009 0.75 19.00 
400 5/21/2010 0.37 12/8/2009 0.75 152.00 
750 6/14/2010 0.37 12/23/2009 0.75 285.00 
750 6/14/2010 0.37 12/22/2009 0.66 217.50 
1,000 8/20/2009 0.38 9/23/2009 1.35 970.00 
400 5/17/2010 0.38 12/11/2009 0.73 140.00 
580 8/17/2009 0.38 9/9/2009 0.70 185.60 
420 8/17/2009 0.38 9/1/2009 0.66 117.60 
250 5/14/2010 0.38 12/22/2009 0.66 70.00 
1,000 8/17/2009 0.38 8/27/2009 0.55 170.00 
1,000 8/21/2009 0.39 9/24/2009 1.51 1,120.00 
1,000 8/21/2009 0.39 10/13/2009 1.02 630.00 
500 8/21/2009 0.39 9/16/2009 0.96 285.00 
1,000 8/21/2009 0.39 10/14/2009 0.90 510.00 
500 8/21/2009 0.40 9/16/2009 0.89 245.00 
500 2/26/2010 0.40 10/9/2009 0.88 240.00 
500 8/21/2009 0.40 9/1/2009 0.66 130.00 
750 8/24/2009 0.41 9/18/2009 0.94 397.50 
250 8/24/2009 0.41 9/4/2009 0.72 77.50 
1,000 2/3/2010 0.42 9/25/2009 1.45 1,030.00 
1,000 2/3/2010 0.42 9/23/2009 1.33 910.00 
1,000 2/3/2010 0.42 9/23/2009 1.28 860.00 
1,000 2/3/2010 0.42 10/5/2009 1.25 830.00 
1,000 2/3/2010 0.42 10/6/2009 1.17 750.00 
100 4/14/2010 0.42 10/21/2009 0.99 57.00 
250 4/13/2010 0.42 10/16/2009 0.75 82.50 
150 4/14/2010 0.42 10/16/2009 0.75 49.50 
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1,000 8/24/2009 0.43 9/28/2009 1.48 1,050.00 
200 8/24/2009 0.43 10/12/2009 0.99 112.00 
320 4/15/2010 0.43 10/19/2009 0.88 144.00 
300 4/12/2010 0.43 10/16/2009 0.75 96.00 
750 8/24/2009 0.43 9/4/2009 0.72 217.50 
100 2/23/2010 0.43 9/3/2009 0.72 29.00 
275 2/23/2010 0.43 9/3/2009 0.70 74.25 
350 4/26/2010 0.43 10/28/2009 0.70 94.50 
1,000 8/25/2009 0.43 9/1/2009 0.64 210.00 
50 8/24/2009 0.43 8/27/2009 0.55 6.00 
600 1/29/2010 0.44 9/25/2009 1.43 594.00 
400 2/1/2010 0.44 9/25/2009 1.43 396.00 
400 2/1/2010 0.44 10/6/2009 1.11 268.00 
600 2/18/2010 0.44 10/6/2009 1.11 402.00 
500 3/4/2010 0.44 10/9/2009 0.88 220.00 
250 4/8/2010 0.44 10/19/2009 0.88 110.00 
225 4/27/2010 0.44 11/2/2009 0.85 92.25 
375 2/1/2010 0.44 9/3/2009 0.70 97.50 
500 3/4/2010 0.44 9/8/2009 0.70 130.00 
225 4/26/2010 0.44 10/28/2009 0.70 58.50 
225 2/1/2010 0.44 8/27/2009 0.55 24.75 
650 2/19/2010 0.45 9/21/2009 0.99 351.00 
280 4/16/2010 0.45 10/19/2009 0.88 120.40 
500 4/27/2010 0.45 11/2/2009 0.85 200.00 
500 1/29/2010 0.45 8/27/2009 0.74 145.00 
415 2/3/2010 0.45 8/27/2009 0.74 120.35 
85 2/22/2010 0.45 8/27/2009 0.74 24.65 
215 2/19/2010 0.45 9/10/2009 0.73 60.20 
135 2/19/2010 0.45 9/3/2009 0.72 36.45 
400 2/22/2010 0.45 9/3/2009 0.72 108.00 
365 2/22/2010 0.45 9/3/2009 0.72 98.55 
350 2/25/2010 0.45 9/3/2009 0.70 87.50 
300 4/20/2010 0.45 10/28/2009 0.70 75.00 
250 4/20/2010 0.45 10/28/2009 0.70 62.50 
80 2/25/2010 0.45 9/1/2009 0.66 16.80 
630 1/29/2010 0.45 8/27/2009 0.58 81.90 
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Shares Purchase Date Cost ($) Sale Date Proceeds ($) Profit ($) 
70 2/25/2010 0.45 8/27/2009 0.58 9.10 
200 4/19/2010 0.46 10/21/2009 0.99 106.00 
650 4/27/2010 0.46 11/4/2009 0.88 273.00 
350 4/27/2010 0.46 11/2/2009 0.85 136.50 
350 2/12/2010 0.47 9/25/2009 1.40 325.50 
500 3/11/2010 0.47 9/25/2009 1.40 465.00 
1,000 3/10/2010 0.47 10/1/2009 1.25 780.00 
1,000 3/11/2010 0.47 9/22/2009 0.99 520.00 
800 3/5/2010 0.47 10/7/2009 0.72 200.00 
200 3/5/2010 0.47 9/9/2009 0.70 46.00 
225 1/28/2010 0.47 8/27/2009 0.55 18.00 
850 8/26/2009 0.48 9/29/2009 1.35 739.50 
150 8/26/2009 0.48 10/12/2009 1.06 87.00 
500 8/26/2009 0.48 10/12/2009 1.06 290.00 
350 2/2/2010 0.48 10/12/2009 1.06 203.00 
350 3/12/2010 0.48 9/21/2009 0.99 178.50 
500 8/26/2009 0.48 9/16/2009 0.96 240.00 
350 4/7/2010 0.48 11/4/2009 0.88 140.00 
275 4/28/2010 0.48 11/2/2009 0.85 101.75 
275 4/22/2010 0.48 10/28/2009 0.77 79.75 
275 4/23/2010 0.48 10/28/2009 0.77 79.75 
300 4/9/2010 0.48 10/16/2009 0.75 81.00 
200 4/1/2010 0.48 10/7/2009 0.72 48.00 
250 4/23/2010 0.48 10/28/2009 0.70 55.00 
400 2/5/2010 0.48 8/27/2009 0.58 40.00 
400 2/5/2010 0.48 8/27/2009 0.58 40.00 
250 4/16/2010 0.49 10/21/2009 0.99 125.00 
225 4/21/2010 0.49 10/28/2009 0.77 63.00 
225 4/22/2010 0.49 10/28/2009 0.77 63.00 
220 2/3/2010 0.49 9/9/2009 0.70 46.20 
250 3/5/2010 0.49 9/8/2009 0.70 52.50 
250 4/16/2010 0.49 10/28/2009 0.70 52.50 
50 4/21/2010 0.49 10/28/2009 0.70 10.50 
150 3/5/2010 0.50 9/25/2009 1.40 135.00 
150 3/26/2010 0.50 9/29/2009 1.35 127.50 
1,000 4/1/2010 0.50 10/6/2009 1.12 620.00 
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450 4/1/2010 0.50 10/21/2009 0.99 220.50 
500 4/5/2010 0.50 10/12/2009 0.99 245.00 
300 4/5/2010 0.50 10/12/2009 0.99 147.00 
150 4/1/2010 0.50 10/19/2009 0.88 57.00 
785 3/5/2010 0.50 9/10/2009 0.73 180.55 
 
